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INTRODUCTION 
That the American criminal justice system rewards with reduced sentences 
those criminal defendants who plead guilty rather than go to trial will come as a 
surprise to no one. The result of this of course is that invariably those who 
choose to go to trial and are convicted receive heavier sentences than had they 
chosen to plead guilty or than their similarly situated co-defendants who do 
plead guilty receive.1 As obvious and inevitable as this result is, American 
courts at every level have engaged in all sorts of verbal and conceptual gym-
nastics to avoid acknowledging this reality. This may be due to the optics of 
acknowledging that this difference in the severity of a sentence is due primarily 
to the defendant’s decision to exercise his constitutional right to trial. Unfortu-
nately, courts have been far more sensitive to these optics than to the intellectu-
al dishonesty and the real consequences created by differential sentencing 
based on the choice of a defendant whether to seek a trial. This response leads 
not only to absurd and disingenuous opinions attempting to justify differential 
sentencing, but also has frustrated efforts to improve the ever more ubiquitous 
practice of plea bargaining in the United States. 
Part I of this article will enumerate and examine the various arguments that 
courts have made to justify a system in which defendants are punished for de-
ciding to exercise their constitutional right to trial.2 Those justifications begin 
with the assertion that while plea bargaining rewards the decision to save the 
system the time and expense of a trial, it does not punish those defendants who 
choose not to plead guilty.3 The article will then discuss how this assertion is 
flawed theoretically and how this flaw is magnified when examined pragmati-
cally.4 Another justification offered for differential sentencing is based on the 
theories of sentencing, specifically on the theory of rehabilitation as a factor in 
sentencing.5 This justification holds that the defendant’s guilty plea represents 
his first step on the road to rehabilitation and therefore allows for a reduced 
sentence than had he gone to trial and been convicted.6 While there is a purely 
theoretical defense for this justification, the realities of why defendants plead 
guilty belie its use as a reason for differential sentencing. 
The final two justifications for differential sentencing share the quality of 
not being fundamentally flawed (as are the reasons above), but they are either 
numerically insignificant or are beside the point of whether differential sentenc-
                                                        
1  See infra notes 20, 21. 
2  See infra Sections I.A–D. 
3  See infra Section I.A. 
4  See infra Section I.A. 
5  See infra Section I.B. 
6  See infra Section I.B. 
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ing amounts to punishment for exercising the right to trial.7 Specifically, some 
courts defend significantly heavier sentences given to defendants after trial than 
the sentences they were offered to plead guilty based on what the judge sup-
posedly learned about the defendant’s greater participation in the crime or the 
crime’s more serious nature during the trial.8 While this may be true in a few 
isolated cases, it unduly minimizes the information most judges have about the 
crime and the defendant when a guilty plea is taken. Perhaps more significant-
ly, it fails to account for the fact that almost all defendants convicted at trial re-
ceive harsher sentences than they would have received had they plead guilty. 
That same sentence disparity exists with respect to two similarly defendants 
when one pleads guilty and the other is convicted at trial.9 The final argument 
as to why differential sentencing is not punishment for exercising the right to 
trial revolves around the concept of plea bargaining as a negotiation.10 In plea 
negotiations, the defendant who chooses not to reach a bargain receives the 
sentence he does as a result of these failed negotiations, not as a form of pun-
ishment.11 While there may be some truth to this, it in no way offers a rational 
justification for differential sentencing that conforms to any of the accepted 
goals of punishment and how such punishment is traditionally determined.12 
Recognizing that the differential sentencing that almost always flows from 
plea bargaining is punishment for exercising the right to trial, does not end the 
discussion of whether and what type of plea bargaining system the constitution 
permits. It begins the discussion. There is a way in which courts can escape 
from the flawed and at times shallow justifications offered for differential sen-
tencing without abandoning the plea bargaining system that many regard as es-
sential to the functioning of our criminal justice system.13 Part II of this article 
will examine the principle that permits the government at times to place a price 
on the exercise of a constitutional right and just how that principle would apply 
to plea bargaining.14 The result of such an application would be a more honest 
approach to how the criminal justice system operates and provide a vehicle for 
facilitating positive changes in the system.15 
The final part of this article discusses one way in which abandoning the 
unpersuasive and unnecessary defenses of differential sentencing and adopting 
the more honest approach to the nature of plea bargaining would permit greater 
judicial participation in the bargaining process.16 Such participation could go 
                                                        
7  See infra Sections I.C.–I.D. 
8  See infra Section I.C. 
9  See discussion infra Section I.A. 
10  See infra Section I.D. 
11  See infra Section I.D. 
12  See discussion infra Section I.D. 
13  See infra Part II. 
14  See infra Part II. 
15  See infra Part II. 
16  See infra Part III. 
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beyond the role some, but not all jurisdictions currently permit of allowing 
judges to advise defendants of their sentence should they plead guilty.17 Specif-
ically, it would permit defendants to get advice from the judge on what range of 
sentence they could expect if they reject the plea offer, go to trial, and are con-
victed.18 Such advice would allow a defendant to make a genuinely informed 
choice about whether to accept a plea of guilty at the time it is offered.19 
I. DEFENSES OF DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCING 
 Criminal defendants who are convicted after exercising their constitutional 
right to a trial invariably receive harsher sentences than they would have had 
they chosen to plead guilty.20 Viewed another way, between two defendants 
charged with similar crimes and possessing similar backgrounds, the one who 
chooses to plead guilty will receive a less harsh sentence than the one who is 
convicted after a trial.21 That this almost inevitable enhancement in sentencing, 
                                                        
17  See infra Part III. 
18  See infra Part III. 
19  See infra Part III. 
20  See, e.g., Correia v. Hall, 364 F.3d 385, 387 (1st Cir. 2004) (Defendant was offered a plea 
deal of five to seven years. Defendant rejected the State’s offer and went to trial where he 
was convicted and sentenced to twelve to seventeen years); United States v. Thomas, 114 
F.3d 228, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Defendant was offered a plea deal of five years. Defendant 
rejected the State’s offer and went to trial where he was convicted and sentenced to life); 
Cousin v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 511, 512 (5th Cir. 1979) (Defendant was offered a plea deal 
of ten years. Defendant rejected the State’s offer and went to trial where he was convicted 
and sentenced to thirty years); Walker v. Walker, 259 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003) (Defendant was offered a plea deal of eight years to life. Defendant rejected the 
State’s offer and went to trial where he was convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years to 
life); Prado v. State, 816 So.2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (Defendant was offered 
a plea deal of four years. Defendant rejected the State’s offer and went to trial where he was 
convicted and sentenced to forty years); People v. Dennis, 328 N.E.2d 135, 136 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1975) (Defendant was offered a plea deal of two to four years. Defendant rejected the State’s 
offer and went to trial where he was convicted and sentenced to forty to eighty years); see 
also Comment, The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sen-
tence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 207 (1956) (“The estimates of the extent to which the fine or prison 
term was diminished for a defendant pleading guilty varied from 10 to 95 per cent of the 
punishment which would ordinarily be given after trial and conviction.”); LINDSEY DEVERS, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING 3 (2011), 
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
B3KL-6RLE]. 
21  See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 152 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Stevenson, 573 F.2d 1105, 1106 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d. 500, 501, 
503 (7th Cir. 1960). In Wiley, the court unsurprisingly found that his decision to go to trial 
was the apparent motivating factor for the three-year sentence meted out to the defendant, a 
first-time offender described by the court as an “accessory” in the crime. Id. at 503. The 
court compared Wiley’s sentence with that of McGhee, the “principal” offender and “most 
active participant in the crime.” Id. The court describes McGhee as a man who “had four 
prior felony convictions, was the ringleader in this matter, and, subsequent to this offense 
and while out on bond, committed two other similar offenses.” Id. After pleading guilty, 
McGhee received a sentence of two years. Id. At other times, courts will strain to justify the 
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occurring for the most part when the only variable in the two situations is the 
choice of a defendant to go to trial, amounts to punishment for exercising the 
right to trial should be obvious.22 Obvious though it may be, the judicial system 
has struggled to come to grips with this reality for reasons related to the already 
negative aura surrounding plea bargaining in the United States23, the optics of 
acknowledging our system punishes for the exercise of a constitutional right 
and the emotional and intellectual difficulty of confronting the real issues sur-
                                                                                                                                 
disparity in sentences among defendants charged with the same crimes without acknowledg-
ing that the disparity was based on the decision of one to plead guilty and the other to go to 
trial. A blatant example of this occurred in Jung v. State, 145 N.W.2d 684 (Wis. 1966). Jung 
and his co-defendants were charged with armed robbery and attempted murder stemming 
from a supermarket robbery in which a police officer was shot. Id. at 685, 686. Jung was the 
driver of the getaway car, whereas the two who plead guilty entered the supermarket and 
committed the robbery. Id. at 686. Jung, a married father of five children, had no prior crim-
inal record, whereas the two who plead guilty also plead guilty to several other offenses, one 
of them to “six other unrelated crimes including armed robbery.” Id. at 688. The judge sen-
tenced Jung to a total of sixty years in prison and the codefendants who plead guilty to twen-
ty-five years. Id. The result of these sentences was that Jung’s conditional release date was 
fifteen years after that of the other two. Id. at 690. In affirming these sentences, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court rejected some of the typical arguments used to justify differential sen-
tences, such as that pleading guilty is the first step on the road to rehabilitation or that the 
codefendants’ agreements to cooperate in the case were mitigating factors in the sentencing. 
Id. at 688–89. It then adopted the arguable position that, for sentencing purposes, the driver 
of the car can be regarded as equally culpable as those who entered the store and pointed the 
gun at the victims. Id. at 690. Far more troubling was the court’s apparent disregard of the 
substantially harsher sentence meted out to the only perpetrator with no other known crimi-
nal behavior. In rejecting Jung’s assertion that his longer sentence was due to his decision to 
stand trial, the court described various aspects of the crime that demonstrated its disparity. 
Id. at 688–90. None of these addressed in any way why Jung’s sentence was longer than his 
two codefendants. Ultimately, the court seemed to base its decision on the fact that the trial 
judge did not affirmatively indicate he was punishing Jung for exercising his right to trial. Id. 
at 689. 
22  Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d. 50, 68–69 (D. Mass. 2001): 
As a practical matter this means, as between two similarly situated defendants, that if the one 
who pleads and cooperates gets a four-year sentence, then the guideline sentence for the one 
who exercises his right to trial by jury and is convicted will be twenty years. 
 Not surprisingly, such a disparity imposes an extraordinary burden on the free exercise of the 
right to an adjudication of guilt by one’s peers. Criminal trial rates . . . are plummeting due to the 
simple fact that today we punish people—punish them severely—simply for going to trial. 
See also State v. Baldwin, 629 P.2d 222, 225 (Mont. 1981), in which the court wrote: 
 It may be difficult to distinguish between situations where leniency is offered in exchange for a 
plea and situations where the defendant is punished for exercising his right to trial by jury. In the 
absence of clear indications in the record to the contrary, a trial judge could justify any disparity 
between a sentence offered in exchange for a plea of guilty and the sentence actually imposed 
following a jury trial simply by characterizing the sentence offered in the plea bargaining pro-
cess as an offer of leniency—regardless of the judge’s true motivations. 
23  JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 1 (Hiram E. Chodosh ed., 2009): 
Some have even compared the coercive aspects of plea bargaining to the procedures of medieval 
inquisitions. Plea bargaining has been criticized for its potential to undermine the search for truth 
in criminal prosecutions, and it is blamed for interfering with victims’ rights. Moreover, the lack 
of transparency in plea negotiations is said to reduce the public legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system. 
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rounding the benefits and problems regarding the manner in which we dispose 
of 95 percent of the cases in the criminal justice system.24 If we are to move 
forward in a meaningful way to address such issues that prevent plea bargain-
ing from working better for all involved, we need to abandon the largely facile 
defenses to the reality that differential sentencing based on the accused’s deci-
sion whether to plead guilty is punishment for exercising the right to trial. 
The courts have generally offered defenses of differential sentencing that 
fall roughly into four categories.25 They are: 1) the system does not punish 
those who are convicted after a trial, it merely rewards those who plead 
guilty;26 2) there is a difference for sentencing purposes between one who 
pleads guilty and one who is convicted after trial, in that the former has taken 
the first step on the road to rehabilitation and therefore deserves a less harsh 
sentence;27 3) after a trial, the sentencing judge learns substantially more about 
the evil of the defendant and the seriousness of his crime that she was not 
aware of when there would have been a guilty plea;28 and 4) the difference in 
sentences before and after trial results from the give and take of negotiations 
rather than punishment, in other words: you gambled, you lost.29 The first two 
justifications for differential sentencing are seriously flawed both in theory and 
in practice. The third defense may have some validity in limited cases, howev-
er, it does not explain why a sentence after trial is almost always harsher than if 
the defendant had plead guilty. The final justification is undoubtedly correct, 
but gambling and losing is inconsistent with the traditional reasons why we 
sentence those convicted of crimes to greater or lesser sentences. 
A. It Is a Benefit Not a Punishment 
 Perhaps the justification offered most often for differential sentencing is 
the win/win notion that the criminal justice system offers a benefit to those who 
plead guilty while merely meting out the sentence the accused deserves if he 
                                                        
24  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 276–77 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 
DEVERS, supra note 20 at 3. 
25  See supra text accompanying notes 2–3, 5, 8, 10. 
26  See, e.g., United States v. Long, 823 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Stevenson, 573 F.2d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir. 1978); Weathington v. Wainwright, 486 F. Supp. 
934, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Stanley v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1315, 1318 (Ind. 1985); In re D.R.R., 
322 S.W.3d 771, 773 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010). 
27  See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970); United States v. Rodriguez, 
64 F.3d 638, 643 (11th Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. Gardner v. Meyer, 519 F. Supp. 75, 
83 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 687–88 (N.D. Ill. 1960). 
28  Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801 (1989); State v. Molinario, 530 So. 2d 665, 668 (La. 
Ct. App. 1988); State v. Mitchell, 691 N.E.2d 354, 356 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
29  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363–64 (1978); Dingle v. Stevenson, 840 F.3d 
171, 175 (4th Cir. 2016); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also 
Richard L. Lippke, To Waive or Not to Waive: The Right to Trial and Plea Bargaining, 2 
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 181, 184 (2008). 
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exercises his right to trial and is convicted.30 Who can argue with a system that 
benefits many and harms none? It is likely the simple nature of this bene-
fit/punishment rationale combined with its optimistic vision of the criminal jus-
tice system that accounts for its popularity in judicial responses to challenges 
by defendants to sentences substantially higher after trial than those offered as 
part of a plea bargain.31 These challenges stem both from cases in which de-
fendants receive significantly harsher penalties after trial than they were offered 
in a plea bargain32 and from those in which the defendant who was convicted 
after a trial receives a greater sentence than his co-defendants with similar or 
worse criminal records who were equal or more primary participants in the 
crime, but had the good sense to accept the prosecutor’s plea offer.33 
The benefit/punishment rationale relies on the assertion that the punish-
ment one deserves for criminal behavior is the sentence he receives after being 
convicted at trial.34 This would be the “regular” sentence.35 It follows, there-
fore, that were he to accept a plea bargain with the virtually inevitable reduced 
sentence awarded in exchange for his plea of guilt, this discount constitutes a 
benefit, a departure from the sentence he deserved.36 The vast and varied ways 
in which both prosecutors and judges exercise discretion, however, belies the 
notion of a “regular” sentence.37 Except when the sentencing options of the 
judge are limited by crimes that have mandatory minimum sentences, judges 
rarely have any meaningful limits to the range of sentences they can mete out 
within the often broad statutory limits of permissible sentences for crimes in 
                                                        
30  United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209 (1995); F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma 
M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the 
Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 225 (2002) (“The only way a plea 
is attractive to a defendant is if it offers a large sentence differential. Thus, judges must in-
crease the cost of going to trial by increasing the post-verdict sentence. One way that many 
courts have avoided this constitutional conundrum is by classifying the judge’s actions (the 
presentation of a large sentencing differential) as a denial of a benefit rather than a penalty”). 
31  See e.g., Scott, 419 F.2d at 278 (“The temptation is strong in the area of plea bargaining to 
assume that defendants convicted after trial receive a ‘normal’ sentence while those who 
plead guilty and save the Government the cost of a trial receive special “leniency” in ex-
change. If this analysis were valid, some defendants would win and none would lose. But in 
reality there are winners and losers”). 
32  See cases cited supra note 20; see also Gregory M. Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining, 101 IOWA 
L. REV. 609, 612 (2016). 
33  See cases cited supra note 21; see also State v. Donohoe, 895 P.2d 590, 592 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1995). 
34  Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 619 (2005). 
35  Steven P. Grossman, An Honest Approach to Plea Bargaining, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
101, 111 (2005). 
36  Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219–20 (1978) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 751 (1970)); Lopez v. United States, 857 F. Supp. 1000, 1009 (D.P.R. 1994). 
37  Were there such a thing as a regular sentence, surely it would be the one meted out in the 
ninety-five percent of cases disposed of through plea bargaining and not the five percent that 
result from trial convictions. See supra note 24. 
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most jurisdictions.38 This in part accounts for the disparate sentences given to 
defendants convicted of similar crimes, often with similar backgrounds.39 It was 
the unfairness of this disparity in sentencing that led in part to the implementa-
tion of mandatory sentencing guidelines, such as the ones governing federal 
courts embodied in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.40 Such mandatory 
guidelines were deemed by many to have significant problems41 and were ulti-
mately determined to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.42 Although 
these guidelines still exist and federal judges are instructed to consult them be-
fore sentencing, the judge is free to go above or below the guidelines when 
meting out a sentence.43 Many states do not even have advisory guidelines, and, 
thus, judges have especially broad discretion in their sentencing practices.44 
There are also significant opportunities within the process of a criminal 
case for a prosecutor to exercise broad discretion over the eventual sentence the 
defendant will receive if convicted at trial.45 The initial decision regarding what 
level of charges to bring, involves often critical determinations concerning the 
seriousness of the crime or the prosecutor’s view about the nature of the ac-
cused.46 As to the former, consider an assault stemming from a fight in which 
the accused hits the victim with his fist, then grabs the stick that the victim is 
holding and slams it against the victim’s knee causing a bruised jaw and severe 
                                                        
38  See G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 248 (3d ed. 2012). 
39  Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sen-
tencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 75–76 (2015). 
40  Daniel K. Brough, Breaking Down the Misprison Walls: Looking Back on the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, After Booker, Through a Bloomian Lens, 82 N.D. L. REV. 413, 436–
37 (2006). 
41  See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Douglas A. 
Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Exploring the Risk of Disparity from Differ-
ences in Defense Counsel Under Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. REV. 435, 444 (2002); 
Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence That 
Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 42 (2000); 
Marc Miller, Rehabilitating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 JUDICATURE 180, 180 
(1995); R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Psy-
chological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 739, 742 
(2001); Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: 
Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 
454 (1994); Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980—
2000, 29 CRIME & JUST. 39, 100–01 (2002). 
42  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 267 (2005). 
43  Id. at 245; Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 59 (2007). 
44  See generally, Neal B. Kauder & Brian J. Ostrom, State Sentencing Guidelines, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (2008), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/State_ 
Sentencing_Guidelines.ashx [https://perma.cc/A58G-8WVG] (noting that as of 2006, only 
twenty-one states had sentencing guidelines in place); Donald A. Dripps, Guilt, Innocence, 
and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1352 (2016). 
45  See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 
1525 (1981). 
46  Id. at 1526–27; See e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-34-1-2.5 (West 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 769.13 (West 2007). 
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knee pain. In such a scenario, depending on the jurisdiction in question, a pros-
ecutor may charge various degrees of assault. In criminal statutes, the levels of 
assault are often distinguished by the difference between physical injury and 
serious physical injury or whether and what kind of a weapon was used in the 
commission of the crime.47 The prosecutor might charge the maximum allowed 
by law, might believe that the injuries were not that serious and charge a lower 
felony, or might believe it was really just a fight between two people and 
charge a simple assault.  
Perhaps the accused will be persuaded to offer information leading to the 
conviction of criminals in other cases, resulting in a prosecutorial decision to 
charge the defendant with misdemeanor assault or perhaps not charge him at 
all.48 The difference in this prosecutorial charging decision can result in the de-
fendant being charged as a high level felon facing decades in prison after con-
viction at trial, or a low level felon likely to receive a lesser prison term, or a 
misdemeanant, often punished with some non-incarceration sentence such as 
probation.49 What then is the regular sentence for one convicted of hitting 
                                                        
47  Compare, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 1965) (“A person is guilty of assault in 
the third degree when: . . . [w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes 
such injury to such person or to a third person”), with id. § 120.05 (“A person is guilty of 
assault in the second degree when: . . . [w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to anoth-
er person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person”). Compare S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-3-600(C)(1) (2015) (“A person commits the offense of assault and battery in the 
first degree if the person unlawfully: (a) injures another person, and the act: (i) involves non-
consensual touching of the private parts of a person, either under or above clothing, with 
lewd and lascivious intent; or (ii) occurred during the commission of a robbery, burglary, 
kidnapping, or theft; or (b) offers or attempts to injure another person with the present ability 
to do so, and the act: (i) is accomplished by means likely to produce death or great bodily 
injury; or (ii) occurred during the commission of a robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or theft.”), 
with id. § 16-3-600(D)(1) (“A person commits the offense of assault and battery in the se-
cond degree if the person unlawfully injures another person, or offers or attempts to injure 
another person with the present ability to do so, and: (a) moderate bodily injury to another 
person results or moderate bodily injury to another person could have resulted; or (b) the act 
involves the nonconsensual touching of the private parts of a person, either under or above 
clothing”). Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-201 (West 1999) (“A person commits the 
offense of assault if the person: (a) purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another; 
(b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a weapon; (c) purposely or knowingly 
makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with any individual; or (d) pur-
posely or knowingly causes reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in another”), with id. 
§ 45-5-202 (A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if the person purposely or 
knowingly causes serious bodily injury to another or purposely or knowingly, with the use of 
physical force or contact, causes reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury or death in 
another”). 
48  See Prosecution Function, A.B.A. § 3-3.9, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/crim 
inal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pfunc_blk.html#3.9 [https://perma.cc/9C 
UE-MNRK] (last visited Mar. 24, 2017). 
49  See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18–20 (2003); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 
263, 265–66 (1980). See also Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecu-
tors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1519–20 (2000); Vorenberg, 
supra note 45, at 1526. 
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someone with fist and stick and causing injuries similar to those described 
above? 
 Additionally, who the defendant is often plays a significant role in what 
charges are brought.50 The presence of a serious criminal history may convince 
a prosecutor to either charge the defendant as a persistent felon, which would 
warrant a mandatory enhanced sentence, or to only charge the defendant for the 
actual crime committed.51 That was precisely the situation that led to the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes.52 The state prosecutor 
charged Hayes with uttering a forged instrument for which Hayes faced two to 
ten years in prison.53 Apparently, the prosecutor determined that despite Hayes’ 
prior two felony convictions, a decision to charge him under the Kentucky Ha-
bitual Criminal Act mandating life imprisonment for this crime involving 
$88.30, was not warranted.54 That determination changed however, when 
Hayes turned down the offer of a guilty plea in exchange for the prosecutor 
recommending a five-year prison term.55 The prosecutor then re-charged Hayes 
under the above act, and after his conviction at trial, Hayes received the manda-
tory life sentence.56 What then is the regular sentence for someone charged with 
such a forgery in Kentucky, even for a defendant with two prior felony convic-
tions, when the crime charged by the prosecutor can make such a difference? 
Even where there is no such mandatory distinction in penalties between various 
charges that could be brought, the prosecutor might use the criminal record of 
the defendant as a factor in exercising his or her discretion regarding the charg-
es to bring with a similar result regarding the post-trial sentence.57  
Another use of prosecutorial discretion in a way that destroys the concept 
of a regular sentence after trial is the sentencing recommendation the prosecu-
tor makes after the defendant is convicted.58 While the judge is not bound by 
the prosecutor’s recommendation of a certain sentence, judges regularly take 
                                                        
50  See infra text accompanying note 51. 
51  See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358–59 (1978); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 
266. Rummel was charged with felony theft in Texas for obtaining $ 120.75 by false pre-
tenses. Texas punished such offenses at the time with a prison sentence from two to ten 
years. The prosecutor chose to proceed against Rummel under a Texas recidivist statute, and 
eventually he was sentenced to life imprisonment. See also Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17, in which 
the Court discusses California’s statute affording prosecutors the discretion to treat certain 
crimes as felonies or misdemeanors. Such a decision was critical in determining application 
of the state’s Three Strikes Law then in existence. 
52  Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 357. 
53  Id. at 358. 
54  Id. at 358–59. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  Vorenberg, supra note 45, at 1525–26; see also supra text accompanying note 51 (discus-
sion of Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003)). 
58  See infra text accompanying notes 59–63. 
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such a recommendation into consideration for various reasons.59 While the 
prosecutor’s recommendation may be based on many factors, such as the ones 
referred to above, it may also be based on the plea offer that the defendant 
turned down before trial.60 All prosecutors realize that if the sentence recom-
mendation they make after trial does not exceed the one offered as part of a 
guilty plea, few defendants would have any incentive to accept the original of-
fer and plead guilty.61 In most cases the ultimate sentence the judge metes out 
will not exceed the prosecutor’s recommended sentence.62 So again, while not 
necessarily determinative of the sentence, the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion can be significant at this stage as well. 
In almost all non-capital cases for which there is not a precise mandatory 
sentence, it is the judge who ultimately decides the defendant’s sentence.63 But 
for the small minority of cases in which the judge is limited by mandatory min-
imum sentencing requirements (and even in such cases, the judge often has dis-
cretion about whether and how far to exceed this minimum), the judge still ex-
ercises immense discretion regarding the severity of a sentence.64 So many 
variables may factor into a judge’s sentence that it is impossible to enumerate 
all of them.65 Some of these factors are appropriate sentencing factors, others 
might not be.66 In the former category would be many of the factors related to 
the long accepted theories of why and how severely we sentence people con-
victed of criminal offenses.67 Usually, these theories are categorized as retribu-
tion, incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.68 Retribution calls for a sen-
                                                        
59  Harris v. Superintendent, Va. State Penitentiary, 518 F.2d 1173, 1174 (4th Cir. 1975); Al-
bert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Pro-
posals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 567 (1978). 
60  See Vorenberg, supra note 45, at 1535. 
61  See Gilchrist, supra note 32, at 612 (“Hefty trial penalties empower prosecutors to secure 
guilty pleas in almost all cases[.]”). 
62  Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1059, 1064–66, 1097 (1976) (“Judges seem to fear that if they were to depart too fre-
quently from prosecutorial sentence recommendations, they would find their names in the 
newspapers. It is, in fact, almost as rare for judges to impose substantially more lenient sen-
tences than prosecutors have recommended as it is for them to impose sentences that are 
more severe”). 
63  Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 953 n.1 (2003) (“In 
noncapital felony cases, only five states—Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Vir-
ginia—permit juries to make the sentencing decision”). 
64  HERMAN, supra note 38, at 248; see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 
(1972). 
65  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2010); John H. King, Criminal Procedure from the Viewpoint 
of the Trial Judge, 25 CONN. B.J. 202, 210–213 (1951); see also Bartholomey v. State, 297 
A.2d 696, 706 (Md. 1972) (enumerating a list of factors judges should consider in sentenc-
ing, which are relevant, and even encouraged in determining the sentence to be imposed). 
66  See HERMAN, supra note 38, at 248–50. 
67  Id. at 245–46, 248–50. 
68  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959 (1991); Grossman, supra note 35, at 117; Mary 
Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court’s Capital 
Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (2003). See also United States 
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tence whose severity is commensurate with the seriousness of the crime.69 It is 
a morality-based theory that looks to the blameworthiness of the offender and 
the harm his actions caused.70 Retribution focuses more on the crime than the 
criminal and seeks beyond all else to do justice and achieve fairness.71 
 The other sentencing theories are more utilitarian in nature in that their 
primary goal is to diminish criminal behavior either by the individual criminal 
or the population as a whole.72 Rehabilitation as a theory of sentencing should 
not be confused with mere advocacy for the use of programs designed to help 
the defendant overcome any economic, social, medical, financial or psycholog-
ical problem deemed to have played a role in his criminal behavior.73 Such pro-
grams are favored even by many people who are opposed to rehabilitation-
based sentencing.74 Rehabilitation as a sentencing theory bases the type and se-
verity of the sentence primarily on what and how long it will take for the de-
fendant to overcome whatever problem caused the commission of the crime.75 
Such a sentence focuses considerably more on the offender than the offense, 
                                                                                                                                 
v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 498–500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), for discussion of these sentencing 
theories by a highly regarded expert on the subject, Judge Marvin Frankel. 
69  C. L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 154 (1987); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR 
FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 
(1985); Judge James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 177 (2010). 
70  Gwin, supra note 69, at 177; VON HIRSCH, supra note 69, at 64; see also Grossman, supra 
note 35, at 117–18. 
71  Gwin, supra note 69, at 177; JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, 16 RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE AND 
THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 229 (Wilfrid Sellars & Keith Lehrer eds., 
1979); see also Grossman, supra note 35, at 117. 
72  See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 
456 (1997). 
73  Chad Flanders, The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 49 GA. L. REV. 383, 
389–402 (2015). Rehabilitation as a theory of punishment seeks to impose a sentence based 
on how long the individual offender needs to be rehabilitated. Id. at 393; United States v. 
Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 498–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
74  See Flanders, supra note 73, at 389–95. 
75  Id. at 399–402; NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE ET. AL., SENTENCING, SANCTIONS, AND 
CORRECTIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 24–25 (Robert C. Clark et. 
al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (citing to J.M BURNS & J.S. MATTINA, SENTENCING (1978)); See also 
Bergman, 416 F. Supp. at 498–99, wherein Judge Marvin Frankel described and criticized 
the use of rehabilitation as a theory of punishment: 
The court agrees that this defendant should not be sent to prison for “rehabilitation.” Apart from 
the patent inappositeness of the concept to this individual, this court shares the growing under-
standing that no one should ever be sent to prison for rehabilitation. That is to say, nobody who 
would not otherwise be locked up should suffer that fate on the incongruous premise that it will 
be good for him or her. Imprisonment is punishment. Facing the simple reality should help us to 
be civilized. It is less agreeable to confine someone when we deem it an affliction rather than a 
benefaction. If someone must be imprisoned—for other, valid reasons—we should seek to make 
rehabilitative resources available to him or her. But the goal of rehabilitation cannot fairly serve 
in itself as grounds for the sentence to confinement. 
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and values “curing” the offender over proportionality between crime and pun-
ishment.76 
Advocates of deterrence-based sentencing seek to use punishment to create 
a strong disincentive for the particular offender to re-offend (referred to as spe-
cial or specific deterrence) or to send a similar message to others in the com-
munity contemplating committing a crime, such as the one committed by the 
offender in the instant case (general deterrence).77 Such sentences reflect these 
goals, for example, by conditioning the length of a prison sentence or the 
amount of a fine to that which the judge believes is likely to deter this offender 
or other potential offenders from committing a similar crime.78 
The final theory of punishment, incapacitation, is also utilitarian in that its 
purpose is to protect the public by separating the most dangerous of offenders 
from society.79 Sometimes viewed as the dark side of rehabilitation, an incapac-
itation-based sentence imprisons a criminal offender for as long as it takes for 
him to no longer be a threat to the public.80 
Some judges use one or more of these theories to the exclusion of others, 
while other judges use some or all of the theories in combination, but often pri-
oritize one theory over the others.81 That the decision about which theories to 
use or prioritize leads to substantially different sentences for the same crime is 
obvious.82 In fact, two judges who use the same theory still often arrive at dif-
ferent sentences for similar crimes and criminals.83 Given the application of dif-
ferent theories of punishment and varied sentences even by judges applying the 
same theory, it is impossible to determine what the regular sentence is for a 
particular crime.84 
The broad and varied discretion afforded to prosecutors and judges in the 
vast majority of cases makes it absurd to attempt to claim that there is a regular 
sentence meted out to defendants who are convicted of similar crimes.85 With-
out the ability to make such a determination, one cannot claim the sentence af-
                                                        
76  Judge Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much 
Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 691 (2010); Morris B. Hoffman, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least 
Dangerous Branch Becomes the Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2077 
(2001). 
77  Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70–71 (2005). 
78  See Katelyn Carr, Comment, An Argument Against Using General Deterrence as a Factor 
in Criminal Sentencing, 44 CUMB. L. REV. 249 (2014). 
79  TEN, supra note 69, at 8. 
80  Id. 
81  Steven Grossman & Stephen Shapiro, Judicial Modification of Sentences in Maryland, 33 
U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 23 (2003). 
82  Id.; see also Charles W. Ostrom et al., Judges and Discrimination: Assessing the Theory 
and Practice of Criminal Sentencing, 13–14 (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
grants/204024.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGP6-HXQ9]. 
83  See Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 23. 
84  See supra notes 47–61 and accompanying text. 
85  See supra notes 14–47 and accompanying text. 
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forded to those convicted after trial is the regular sentence for particular types 
of crimes or offenders.86 It follows that if there is no regular sentence meted out 
after trial, then there is no merit to the claim that the reduced sentence one re-
ceives almost inevitably from pleading guilty is a reward and simultaneously 
denying that the greater sentence meted out after conviction at trial is punish-
ment.87 The sentences meted out after trial are too fluid to be labeled as regular. 
Therefore, the difference in the sentences must be regarded as both reward and 
punishment.88 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court rejected a similarly misguided reward-
only rationale when considering the use of the defendant’s cooperation as a fac-
tor in sentencing.89 In Roberts v. United States90, the government asserted that 
the defendant deserved a harsh sentence in part due to his refusal to cooperate 
by naming his criminal associates. In response, Roberts argued that although 
cooperation is “ ‘[a] laudable endeavor’ ” that bears a “ ‘rational connection to a 
defendant’s willingness to shape up and change his behavior[,]’ ” and therefore 
warrants a reduced sentence, he should not be punished for his failure to so co-
operate.91 The Court’s response to this argument was,  
[w]e doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between “enhancing” the 
punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the “leniency” he 
claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The question for decision is 
simply whether petitioner’s failure to cooperate is relevant to the currently un-
derstood goals of sentencing.92 
Applied to plea bargaining and embodying that same reasoning, that same 
sentence would read, “[w]e doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn 
between ‘enhancing’ the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying 
him the ‘leniency’ the court claims would be appropriate if he had plead guilty. 
The question for decision is simply whether petitioner’s failure to plead guilty 
is relevant to the currently understood goals of sentencing.” In other words, fac-
toring into sentencing the accused’s decision about whether to exercise his right 
to trial is both benefit and punishment. What matters is whether that decision 
should affect one’s sentence. 
                                                        
86  Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 658–
60 (1981). 
87  Id.; see also Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“The ‘normal’ 
sentence is the average sentence for all defendants, those who plead guilty and those who 
plead innocent. If we are ‘lenient’ toward the former, we are by precisely the same token 
‘more severe’ toward the latter.”). 
88  See generally Lippke, supra note 29 (arguing that the sentence a defendant receives fol-
lowing a guilty plea is a “waiver reward” and the sentence a defendant receives post-trial is a 
“non-waiver penalty” for exercising the right to trial). 
89  See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980). 
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 557 (quoting Brief for Petitioner). 
92  Id. at 556–57 n.4. 
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The assertion that the reduced sentence accompanying a guilty plea is a 
reward, but the harsher post-trial conviction sentence is not a punishment seems 
even more absurd when viewed in conjunction with the actual extent of plea 
bargaining in the U.S. Roughly 95 percent of criminal cases are disposed of 
without trial in this country.93 Using this reward only theory would mean that 
nineteen of twenty criminal defendants receive a “reward” for their guilty plea, 
whereas the one defendant who is convicted after trial receives the “regular” 
sentence he deserves and is therefore not being punished for exercising his right 
to trial.94 I do not claim this means that differential sentencing reflects only 
punishment and not benefit, but that it further belies the claim that such a dif-
ference between those who plead and those who are convicted after trial is ben-
efit alone. 
Therefore, the benefit/punishment distinction rationale commonly offered 
as a defense to the claim that such differential sentencing reflects punishment 
for exercising the constitutional right to trial is unsupportable. 
B. A Guilty Plea Is the First Step On the Road to Rehabilitation 
As stated above, there are four traditional justifications for punishment: ret-
ribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation.95 The first three of these 
justifications offer no explanation as to why those who choose to go to trial 
should receive harsher sentences than those who plead guilty. Retributionists 
argue for sentences whose severity depends on the extent of the moral wrong 
committed by the offender and the consequences of his offense.96 The focus of 
a retribution-based sentence would be the establishment of a proportional rela-
tionship between crime and punishment.97 Whether a person chooses to plead 
guilty is irrelevant to this relationship, and therefore no defense of differential 
sentencing can be based on retributionist principles.98 
The intent of a deterrence-based sentence is to create a severe enough dis-
incentive to engage in future criminal behavior by either the defendant before 
the court (specific deterrence) or others who are contemplating committing a 
similar crime (general deterrence).99 Whether that sentence results from the of-
fender’s guilty plea or conviction after trial has no impact on the degree to 
                                                        
93  See sources cited supra note 24. 
94  Such a situation is rather like stores that have items “ON SALE” for fifty-one weeks a 
year. If you are unfortunate enough to purchase the item during the other week, are you pay-
ing the “regular” store price for it? See also Alschuler, supra note 86, at 658–60. 
95  See supra Section I.A. 
96  Gwin, supra note 69, at 177. 
97  Id. 
98  In fact, many retributionists would argue that plea bargaining is incompatible with the ret-
ribution model because most plea bargains impose lighter sentences that what would be “de-
served.” Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 118–22 (2003). 
99  Frase, supra note 77, at 70–71. 
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which the defendant or another potential offender is likely to eschew future 
criminal behavior.100 That is unless what the sentencer is hoping to deter is the 
decision to claim one’s right to a trial.101 Deterrence-based sentencing, there-
fore, offers no explanation for the difference in sentences between those who 
plead guilty and those who go to trial.102 
Sentences meted out for incapacitation are designed to separate the most 
dangerous criminals from the rest of society because of the extreme danger 
posed by such criminals.103 The goal is to sentence the defendant to enough 
time to ensure he no longer poses such a danger.104 The decision to plead guilty 
or go to trial tells us nothing about how long it will take for a serial rapist or 
child molester to no longer be dangerous. Accordingly, neither retribution, de-
terrence, nor incapacitation can explain why one who is convicted at trial invar-
iably receives a harsher sentence as opposed to what he was offered to plead 
guilty. The remaining justification for punishment, rehabilitation, does offer 
such a justification theory.105 Rehabilitation as a sentencing theory conditions 
the severity of a sentence primarily on the means and the length of time that 
will be best for “curing” the offender of whatever social, economic, psycholog-
ical, or other factor is believed to have motivated his criminal behavior.106 If 
pleading guilty is viewed as the acceptance of responsibility,107 such acceptance 
can be regarded as the first step on the road to rehabilitation.108 Applying this 
                                                        
100  The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, supra note 
20, at 211. 
101  Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 728 (2005); Id. at 728 
n.25 (noting examples of the Department of Justice requesting stricter sentencing laws. In-
creased sentences make prosecutors’ jobs easier by “creating an incentive for defendants to 
cooperate.” By increasing potential sentences, prosecutors retain enhanced bargaining pow-
er. Enhanced bargaining power and the enhanced risks of trial encourages more defendants 
to accept pleas and avoid trial). 
102  The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, supra note 
20, at 211. 
103  TEN, supra note 69, at 8. 
104  Id. at 7–8. 
105  The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, supra note 
20, at 210. 
106  See Gertner, supra note 76, at 691. See also B. ANTHONY MOROSCO, THE PROSECUTION 
AND DEFENSE OF SEX Crimes 13–14 (1993). 
107  See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2016). Entry of a plea of guilty 
prior to the commencement of trial combined with “truthfully admitting the conduct com-
prising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any addi-
tional relevant conduct for which [he] is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)[,]” 
will constitute significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility for the purposes of sub-
section (a). Id. Application Note 1(A). 
108  McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 47 (2002) (“Acceptance of responsibility is the beginning 
of rehabilitation.”); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Hooten v. State, 442 
S.E.2d 836, 840 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (“[G]uilty pleas are recognized as a significant step to-
ward rehabilitation”); Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea 
Bargaining Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1408 (2004); Jeff Palmer, Note, Abolishing 
Plea Bargaining: An End to the Same Old Song and Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505, 516–17 
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theory, an offender who pleads guilty requires less time to be completely reha-
bilitated than one who goes to trial maintaining his innocence.109 Because this 
is the only punishment theory that justifies differential sentencing, it too is a 
popular response to the assertion that such sentencing amounts to punishment 
for exercising the right to trial. Unfortunately, the theory breaks down when 
confronted with the reality of why defendants in criminal cases actually plead 
guilty.110 
It will surprise no one who has been a defendant in a criminal case, who 
has represented a criminal defendant, or who understands human behavior that 
the vast majority of defendants who plead guilty do so in order to avoid the vir-
tual certainty of the harsher sentence they will receive if convicted at trial.111 
While it is certainly possible (although undoubtedly rare) that the defendant is 
pleading guilty because he wishes to begin to mend his evil ways, such a reason 
is likely to be secondary to the understandable human desire to avoid prison or 
spend the least amount of time there as possible.112 
Those wishing to disregard this reality must still confront the corollary of 
the assertion that pleading guilty is the first step on the road to rehabilitation. 
That is: the decision of those charged with crimes to go to trial manifests a lack 
of rehabilitative likelihood. In fact, people opt to claim their trial-related rights 
for a variety of reasons.113 These reasons generally relate to their belief that 
they will be acquitted at trial or convicted of a lesser offense.114 Sometimes this 
belief is based on a perceived legal impediment to their conviction, such as the 
government’s reliance on a search or seizure of dubious Fourth Amendment 
legality.115 Sometimes defendants believe they are actually innocent of the 
                                                                                                                                 
(1999); The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, supra 
note 20, at 209–10. 
109  See Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really “Ban” Plea Bargaining?: The Core Con-
cerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 761–62 (1998); see, e.g., Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (“[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the 
State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State 
and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter 
the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over 
a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.”). 
110  Charlie Gerstein, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Motives, 15 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 25 
(2016) (arguing that defendants often plead guilty to be released from incarceration, know-
ing if they plead guilty they will likely spend less time incarcerated); Tung Yin, Note, Not a 
Rotten Carrot: Using Charges Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement in Sentencing Un-
der the Federal Guidelines, 83 CAL. L. REV. 419, 458 (1995). 
111  Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1912 (1992); Tina Wan, Note, The Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Problem and a Not-So-Least Restrictive Alternative, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
SOC. JUST. 33, 40 (2007); Yin, supra note 110, at 458. 
112  See The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, supra 
note 20, at 210–11. 
113  See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 38, at 8–10. 
114  Id. at 8. 
115  See id. 
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crimes for which they have been charged.116 Are such individuals less likely to 
be rehabilitated because they wish to claim the protections afforded to them by 
law? For example, if a defendant listens to his attorney’s advice that the gov-
ernment will not be successful in obtaining a conviction against him, is he less 
likely to be rehabilitated than one who ignores such advice and pleads guilty? 
The notion that acknowledging one’s responsibility for a negative behavior 
is the first step towards addressing, correcting, and curing that behavior certain-
ly has support in literature and in practice.117 The Twelve Step Program, made 
famous by Alcoholics Anonymous, has this principle as one of its founda-
tions.118 But that declaration must be sincere and directed—in other words, the 
desire to correct one’s behavior must be the basis, the causative factor that 
leads to engaging in the action taken by the subject.119 It stretches credulity and 
belies the experience of those engaged in the criminal justice process to believe 
that the overwhelming number of defendants who plead guilty do so primarily 
for any reason other than to obtain a benefit in sentencing.120 
It is apparent then that neither rehabilitation nor any other traditional justi-
fication for punishment can be used to support differential sentencing in the 
plea bargaining/trial criminal justice process. 
                                                        
116  Id. 
117  See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33–34 (2002); John Coleman, Take Ownership of 
Your Actions by Taking Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 30, 2012), 
https://hbr.org/2012/08/take-ownership-of-your-actions [https://perma.cc/5YDH-YPU9]; 
Seth A. Grossman, A Thin Line Between Concurrence and Dissent: Rehabilitating Sex Of-
fenders in the Wake of McKune v. Lile, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1111, 1116 (2004); Raffaele 
Rodogno, Shame and Guilt in Restorative Justice, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y, & L. 142, 143, 
154 (2008); John Sabini & Maury Silver, In Defense of Shame: Shame in the Context of 
Guilt and Embarrassment, 27 J. FOR THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 1, 1–15 (1997). 
118  ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: THE STORY 
OF HOW MANY THOUSANDS OF MEN AND WOMEN HAVE RECOVERED FROM ALCOHOLISM 58–
60 (3d. 1976). 
119  See State v. Tiernan, 645 A.2d 482, 486 (R.I. 1994); The Influence of the Defendant’s 
Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, supra note 20, at 210. 
120  LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 75 
(1977); see also Defendants’ Incentives for Accepting Plea Bargains, NOLO.COM, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/plea-bargains-defendants-incentives-29732.html 
[https://perma.cc/L587-YC9X] (last visited Mar. 24, 2018). The Supreme Court noted that 
“[f]or a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty 
and limiting the probable penalty are obvious—his exposure is reduced, the correctional pro-
cesses can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated.” Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). Even those believing themselves to have a signifi-
cant chance of being acquitted at trial are incentivized to plead guilty because they know 
they are highly likely to receive a lower sentence by doing so than if convicted at trial. Jenia 
Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 199, 205 (2006). 
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C. The Sentencing Judge Learns Significantly More About the Defendant and 
the Crime After Trial Than She Knew During Plea Bargaining 
Some cases have justified harsher sentences for criminal defendants who 
choose to go to trial because the sentencing judge learns of aggravating factors 
regarding either the crime or the criminal that she did not know at the time a 
plea would have been taken.121 There are several problems with using this as a 
justification for differential sentencing. As with the first step on the road to re-
habilitation justification discussed above, this theory rests on a largely flawed 
premise that belies what actually happens in most cases.122 Additionally, even if 
this argument has validity in certain instances, appellate courts too often accept 
the assertion that information learned at trial was the causative factor in the en-
hanced post-trial sentence. They do so absent a convincing explanation as to 
what those aggravating factors were or why they played such a substantial role 
in the enhanced post-trial sentence.123 Finally, even if this justification applies 
                                                        
121  Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801 (1989); Morales v. State, 819 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that because the “trial court, at the time of sentencing, received 
greater information about the defendant’s prior convictions and the extensiveness of this, the 
third attack on the victim, than was known to the court when the plea was discussed,” the 
harsher sentence was upheld); see also The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial 
Determination of Sentence, supra note 20, at 218. 
122  See, e.g., People v. Blond, 96 A.D.3d 1149, 1150, 1153 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012), wherein 
the defendant claimed that the disparity between final pre-trial plea offer of three-and-a-half 
years and his ultimate post-trial sentence of twenty-two and two-thirds years plus twenty 
years of post-release supervision was punishment for exercising his right to trial. In rejecting 
the defendant’s argument, the court conceded that the disparity was “significant,” but found 
no evidence “that the sentences were retaliatory or vindictively imposed as a penalty for de-
fendant’s exercise of his right to a jury trial.” Id. at 1153–54. In support of this conclusion, 
the court found that “the crimes are of a serious nature, they were committed against a back-
drop of physical violence, they involved a vulnerable teenager who was living in defendant’s 
household, he received less than the maximum allowable sentence for rape in the first degree 
and he has refused to take any responsibility for his conduct or exhibit any remorse.” Id. at 
1154. It is hard to imagine that when the plea was offered, the prosecutor and judge were not 
aware of most of the factors used by the court above to justify the significantly harsher post-
trial sentence. The defendant had been indicted on ten counts, including the forcible rape and 
sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-old girl. Id. at 1150. Additionally, he was charged with “at-
tempted assault with a brick on his wife, who was the victim’s aunt, and property damage he 
caused to his wife’s vehicle when he repeatedly drove his own vehicle into it. When he was 
arrested and taken into custody, he also caused property damage to a police vehicle by shat-
tering its window in a violent rage.” Id. A pre-trial hearing revealed that the defendant had 
engaged in previous domestic violence. Id. While undoubtedly the trial judge learned more 
details about the crimes during the trial, it seems unlikely that such information could justify 
a prison sentence more than six times that which was offered as part of a guilty plea, given 
what the parties knew of the defendant and the crime at the time the plea was offered. 
123  See, e.g., Hampton v. Wyrick, 588 F.2d. 632, 633–34 (8th Cir. 1978). In Hampton, the 
court affirmed the federal district court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus in which the de-
fendant had argued that he was punished for exercising his right to trial. Id. at 632. During 
plea negotiations, the prosecutor had offered Hampton twenty-five years in prison in ex-
change for a guilty plea, a sentence that the trial judge indicated was acceptable to him. Id. at 
633. After rejecting the plea and being convicted at trial, the judge sentenced Hampton to 
fifty years in prison, double the length or twenty-five years more than what had apparently 
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in certain cases, those cases are likely to be the exception rather than the rule 
and do not come close to explaining the fact that post-trial sentences of crimi-
nal defendants are almost always more substantial than these individuals would 
have received had they pled guilty.124 
To understand why this defense of differential sentencing rests on a largely 
flawed premise, we need to examine the process by which most guilty pleas are 
entered along with what information about the defendant and the crime are 
normally available to the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge before the 
plea is offered and accepted. Of course each jurisdiction, in fact each particular 
court and prosecutor’s office, may have different amounts of material available 
to them at various times during plea negotiations.125 Regarding some minor 
criminal charges, prosecutors might have a boilerplate policy for plea offers, 
and therefore the specific details of the crime may not be known to them.126 For 
all other offenses however, it would be the poor prosecutor that offers a plea 
bargain to a defendant without adequate knowledge of both the alleged offense 
and the defendant’s criminal record.127 While the computer-generated records 
of the defendant’s criminal history can have omissions or errors, they are gen-
                                                                                                                                 
seemed appropriate to the judge during the plea negotiations. Id. In so holding, the federal 
circuit court noted that although the sentence was “unusual, there exists only speculation that 
it was vindictively imposed for petitioner’s exercise of his constitutional right to a jury trial.” 
Id. The court then accepted the basis offered by the state court for why the post-trial sentence 
was so much longer. Id. at 634. “It was within the statutory limits. Further, the trial judge 
testified at the 27.26 hearing that he was influenced in the sentencing by the fact revealed at 
trial as to the vicious nature of the crime and defendant’s record of 13 prior convictions.” Id. 
at 633 (citations omitted) (quoting Hampton v. State, 558 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1977)). That the sentence was within statutory limits sheds no light on the issue of whether 
the sentence was punishment for exercising the right to trial. No mention is made of whether 
the trial judge knew of the defendant’s criminal record at the time of the plea, but it is hard to 
imagine the judge approved of a twenty-five-year prison sentence at that time without such 
knowledge. The final justification for the enhanced sentence relies on the dubious notion that 
the judge apparently was also unaware of the “viciousness” of the crime at the time of the 
plea in a case which involved armed robbery, the taking of a hostage, and the shooting of the 
defendant by a police officer. State v. Hampton, 509 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). 
124  See cases cited supra note 20; see also The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial 
Determination of Sentence, supra note 20, at 209–211. 
125  See Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Wake-Up Call from the Plea-Bargaining Trenches, 19 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 135, 136–37 (1994). 
126  GARY MULDOON, HANDLING A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW YORK § 17:68 (2017) (noting that 
“[i]ndividual prosecutors’ offices may have plea policies for various offenses, such as a ban 
on offering a plea to a lesser offense in a high blood alcohol DWI case, or restrictions post-
indictment.”); Hadar Aviram, et al., Check, Pleas: Toward a Jurisprudence of Defense Eth-
ics in Plea Bargaining, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 775, 837–38 (2014) (quoting Telephone 
Interview by Deanna Dyer with Assistant Public Defender, Orange County, Calif. (Sept. 3, 
2013)) (noting that plea offers for some charges, like a first-time DUI, are standard in the 
prosecutor’s office, and are not subject to deviation). 
127  See Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecu-
torial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 44 (1983) (noting that the primary concern for any 
prosecutor in deciding whether to offer a plea bargain, and what the terms should be, are the 
“circumstances of the offense” and the “characteristics of the offender”). 
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erally accurate and likely have already been the basis for the determination of 
the defendant’s bail and in some cases possibly even for what charges were 
brought.128 Similarly, when they offer pleas, prosecutors usually know most of 
the details of the crime charged.129 For example, not all rapes are the same. 
While every rape is a serious crime, some might warrant harsher sentences than 
others because of the degree of violence involved.130 Of course prosecutors 
likely would have spoken to the rape victim or at least the investigating officer 
to learn this detail among others about the rape before determining the extent of 
the plea to offer the defendant.131 
It is equally obvious that no sensible judge would accept a plea of guilty to 
a lesser charge without knowing the facts of the case.132 This is true even if the 
judge only commits herself to dismissing the higher charge as part of the plea 
deal.133 Where the judge makes a commitment to a sentencing range or agrees 
to a specific sentence as part of the deal, the degree to which the judge knows 
the facts of the case and the background of the accused is likely to be even 
greater.134 No judge wants to have agreed to a plea to a lesser offense and or 
sentence than was embodied in the original charge if it turns out the offense 
was far worse than she knew. To support the assertion that the increase in sen-
tences meted out after trial compared to those discussed or agreed to during 
                                                        
128  See e.g., Banks v. State, 466 A.2d 69, 74 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); James B. Jacobs, 
Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. SAINT THOMAS L.J. 387, 
391, 391 n.24 (2006) (Noting that criminal records are used for a variety of purposes, includ-
ing deciding what charges to bring and to aid in plea bargaining decisions. The author further 
notes that twenty-four states require or permit criminal records to be considered in bail deci-
sions). 
129  See Steven L. Friedman, Comment, Preplea Discovery: Guilty Pleas and the Likelihood 
of Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 529–30 (1971). 
130  This difference in the level of plea offered may stem from just the prosecutor’s view of 
the case or it may be manifested in the law itself. See e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-
303 (West 2017) (rape in the first degree is defined as “vaginal intercourse with another by 
force, or the threat of force, without the consent of the other” with the use of a dangerous 
weapon, an infliction of serious injury on the victim, threatening or placing the victim in fear 
that the victim will be subject to death, suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, serious 
physical injury, or kidnapping, committed while aided and abetted by another, or a rape 
committed in connection with a burglary); Id. § 3-304 (rape in the second degree is defined 
as vaginal intercourse by force, threat of force, without the consent of the other, vaginal in-
tercourse with a person who is cognitively impaired, or vaginal intercourse with a victim un-
der the age of 14 when the person performing is at least 4 years older than the victim). 
131  See Friedman, supra note 129, at 529–30. 
132  See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-1.6(a) (3d ed. 1999). 
133  See id. at 14-3.3(a), (b)(ii). 
134  See Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: 
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 376–
77, 379 (2016). Virtually all information that goes into determining the appropriate sentence 
for a defendant is available at the time that plea negotiations take place. Through interviews 
with prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, the authors describe how judges learn criti-
cal information about the defendant at this time. Computer records usually detail the criminal 
history of the defendant and the defense attorneys customarily provide personal information 
about their clients that may be used to mitigate a plea offer. 
18 NEV. L.J. 769, GROSSMAN  - FINAL 5/15/18  12:24 PM 
790 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:769  
plea bargaining is often due to the additional information judges find out about 
the crime or the accused during trial, requires a belief that judges customarily 
act irresponsibly in accepting pleas of guilty without adequate knowledge of 
the critical elements that go into the sentencing decision—the nature of the 
crime and the defendant’s background. 
While there are undoubtedly certain situations in which what a judge learns 
about the crime or the criminal during trial leads the judge to think the defend-
ant deserves a harsher sentence than she was willing to accept during plea ne-
gotiations, it defies credulity to imagine that the frequency of such situations 
comes anywhere near explaining why nearly all post-trial sentences are more 
severe than any proposed plea agreements. 
D. Enhanced Sentences for Those Defendants Convicted After Trial Is an 
Essential and Inevitable Part of the Negotiation Process That Is Plea 
Bargaining 
The final defense of differential sentencing rests on the recognition that 
plea bargaining is a negotiation and the essence of a negotiation is that each 
side tries to obtain the best outcome necessary to satisfy its interest.135 In most 
cases, for the prosecutor that means obtaining a plea of guilty and a sentence 
commensurate with her assessment of the crime and the criminal.136 For the de-
fendant, this usually means pleading to the least serious charge and receiving 
the most lenient sentence possible.137 Obviously, this often translates in opera-
tion to the prosecutor negotiating for a plea that authorizes more prison time 
and the defendant seeking less time.138 An essential ingredient in this negotia-
tion is the option each side has to take the case to trial should the negotiations 
fail to reach an agreed to plea of guilt.139 For the prosecutor, this risks the pos-
sibility of the defendant being acquitted.140 For the defendant, this risks a trial 
conviction with the almost inevitable result that he will receive a sentence 
harsher than was offered during the plea negotiations. 
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, mentioned above, the Supreme Court used this 
reasoning to dispute the notion that the substantially harsher sentence that 
Hayes received after his re-indictment and conviction, compared to what was 
                                                        
135  WEINREB, supra note 120, at 78, 82; see also, Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1935–
40. 
136  HERMAN, supra note 38, at 5. 
137  Id. at 8. 
138  See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 61, 85 
(1971). 
139  Of course, the defendant without the acquiescence of a quid pro quo from the prosecutor 
or the judge can plead guilty to all of the charges he faces, thus eliminating the possibility of 
a trial. As there is no tangible benefit for their doing so, very few defendants plead guilty in 
such a manner. 
140  Jacqueline L. Schreurs, Note, For the Sake of Public Policy: Plea Bargaining Demands 
Sixth Amendment Protection Due to Its Prevalence and Necessity in the Judicial System, 48 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 629, 644 (2015). 
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offered during plea negotiations, was in fact punishment for exercising his right 
to trial.141 In the Court’s words, “in the ‘give-and-take’ of plea bargaining, there 
is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to 
accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.”142 In other words, the process sur-
rounding the decision to plead guilty or go to trial is a gamble for the accused 
and if you take the gamble, are convicted at trial, and receive a harsher sentence 
than if had you plead guilty, you cannot come back and say you were punished 
for that decision.143 
Nine years before the decision in Hayes, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit used similar reasoning in Scott v. U.S.144 After wisely rejecting the 
benefit/punishment dichotomy discussed in Subsection I.A above as being 
false, Judge David Bazelon offered the following alternative argument for why 
differential sentencing is not punishment for exercising a constitutional right: 
Superficially it may seem that . . . the defendant who insists upon a trial is found 
guilty pays a price for the exercise of his right when he receives a longer sen-
tence than his less venturesome counterpart who pleads guilty. In a sense he has. 
But the critical distinction is that the price he has paid is not one imposed by the 
state to discourage others from a similar exercise of their rights, but rather one 
encountered by those who gamble and lose.145 
Similar to the Court in Hayes, Judge Bazelon justified differential sentenc-
ing as the acceptable price to be paid for taking the risk of going to trial.146 In 
so doing, the accused is seeking the reward of an acquittal with the understand-
ing that he will likely receive a heavier sentence should the gamble prove un-
successful and he loses at trial.147  
The assertion that plea bargaining is a negotiation and that the negotiation 
inevitably involves a gamble for the accused should he reject the plea deal and 
go to trial is reasonable.148 The advantage of this acknowledgment is at least an 
implicit rejection of the other defenses of differential sentencing in that it rec-
ognizes that this difference rests on the defendant’s choice to go to trial and not 
on the unrealistic justifications discussed above.149 The problem with it lies in 
its failure to offer a reason based in any traditional justification for punish-
ment—that explains why defendants who choose the trial option receive or de-
serve heavier sentences than those who plead guilty.150 Unlike retribution, re-
habilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation, gambling and losing has never been 
                                                        
141  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362–65 (1978). 
142  Id. at 363. 
143  Id. at 363–64. 
144  Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
145  Id. 
146  Id. 
147  See H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the 
Criminal Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 70 (2011). 
148  Scott, 419 F.2d at 276–77. 
149  Id. at 270–72; see discussion supra Section I.A. 
150  See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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used as an explanation for how long the government should deprive a person of 
his or her freedom. Clearly the gambling and losing argument does not fall 
within any of the long accepted sentencing justifications. And, as the Supreme 
Court said in Graham v. Florida, “[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penolog-
ical justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”151 
Therefore, unlike the other defenses offered, the give-and-take of negotia-
tions, gamble and lose rationale is a realistic explanation for differential sen-
tencing. However, this explanation offers no sound sentencing theory for why 
those who go to trial should be imprisoned longer than those who plead guilty 
and as with all the other justifications, results in a punishment for the exercise 
of a constitutional right. 
II. THE GOVERNMENT MAY PLACE A PRICE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO TRIAL IF THE SOCIETAL NEED IT SERVES IS SIGNIFICANT 
After acknowledging that the harsher sentence a defendant receives after a 
trial conviction as opposed to the lighter sentence offered for a plea of guilty is 
punishment for exercising his right to trial, we must next determine if a person 
can be lawfully punished for exercising a constitutional right. Cases have held 
that with appropriate justification and limits, it is permissible to place a price on 
the exercise of a constitutional right.152 Some of these cases have involved 
broad constitutional protections, such as the right to free speech, the free exer-
cise of religion, and the right to bear arms.153 Notably, other such cases have 
dealt specifically with sanctioning the inevitable chill on the right to trial that 
stems from the plea bargaining process itself.154 
It has been clear since the Supreme Court’s holding in Sherbert v. Varner 
that even the most fundamental of constitutional rights, such as the free exer-
cise of religion, can be restricted by government actions, where those actions 
meet the “compelling state interest” test.155 In United States v. Lee, for exam-
ple, the appellee claimed his Amish religious beliefs regarding providing for 
one’s own family were violated by the requirement that he pay social security 
taxes.156 The Court accepted both the sincerity of his claim and concluded that 
this did involve an interference with the free exercise of his religion.157 Signifi-
cantly, however, the Court said this determination began rather than ended the 
                                                        
151  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010). 
152  See infra notes 157–83 and accompanying text. 
153  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (right to bear arms); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (free exercise of religion); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570–72 (1942) (free speech). 
154  See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 230 (1978); United States v. Jackson, 390 
U.S. 570, 582 (1968). 
155  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. 
156  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 255 (1982). 
157  Id. at 257. 
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inquiry into its constitutionality and reiterated that such an interference is justi-
fied “[if] it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.”158 
The government interests pertaining to the nature of the social security sys-
tem that were enumerated in Lee bear a resemblance to the justifications for the 
plea bargaining system as well. Specifically, the Court alluded to the nation-
wide breadth of the social security system, its size, and the benefits that flow to 
individuals through social security.159 Finally, the Court noted that without the 
requirement that people contribute to social security, the system could not func-
tion, leading to the conclusion that the governmental interest was “very 
high.”160 Similarly, plea bargaining, with the almost inevitable price it places on 
the constitutional right to trial, is nationwide in its breadth. The system by 
which courts dispose of criminal cases through plea bargaining is not a unitary 
system as is social security, but it is pervasive in the criminal justice systems of 
all fifty states and the federal courts. And while the numbers vary to some de-
gree, it is generally accepted that 90 to 95 percent of criminal cases are dis-
posed of through plea bargaining.161 Lastly, it is hard to argue with the assertion 
that our modern criminal justice system could not function in its current form 
without disposing of as many cases as it does through trial-avoiding guilty 
pleas that save the system time and resources.162 
As with the free exercise of religion, a person can be punished for exercis-
ing other fundamental protections embodied in the Bill of Rights.163 For exam-
ple, regarding the freedom of speech, the Supreme Court noted in Chaplinsky v. 
N.H., “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which ha[ve] never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”164 To so punish, the government must show a compel-
ling state interest.165 Similarly, the exercise of other constitutional rights can be 
punished when a strong government need exists to do so.166 Even as it held that 
the second amendment right to bear arms was a right possessed by individuals 
and invalidated laws that too broadly banned this protection, the Supreme Court 
in District of Columbia v. Heller emphasized that laws prohibiting and punish-
ing the possession of weapons by felons or the mentally ill and those laws that 
                                                        
158  Id. 
159  Id. at 258. 
160  Id. at 258–59. 
161  See sources cited supra note 24. 
162  See infra notes 168–76 and accompanying text. 
163  See infra notes 166–71 and accompanying text. 
164  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (emphasis added). 
165  Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982); First Nat’l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978). 
166  Strict scrutiny is the test used by the court to determine whether the government may 
constitutionally infringe upon an individual’s fundamental rights. This requires the govern-
ment to show there is a compelling state interest for the infringement, and that the govern-
mental act is narrowly tailored to achieving said interest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 
(1973). 
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bar the carrying of weapons into schools or government buildings were still 
lawful.167 In interpreting and applying Heller to a recent second amendment 
challenge to a federal firearms law, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit asserted that Heller allows for laws not only deemed to be non-
burdensome to the right to bear arms (i.e. for groups of people deemed to have 
forfeited this protection), but significantly also for those laws that do burden 
that right.168 The requirement for upholding such laws is that they be shown to 
have the appropriate level of government need.169  
In yet another area of constitutional protection, the Court allowed for limi-
tations on the right to privacy.170 After holding that a New York statute prohib-
iting the sale of contraceptives to minors was unconstitutional in Carey v. Pop-
ulation Services International, the Court observed that not all intrusions into 
privacy rights were invalid.171 In the Court’s words, “even a burdensome regu-
lation may be validated by a sufficiently compelling state interest.”172  
 While courts, including the Supreme Court, have taken pains to avoid ac-
knowledging that meting out harsher penalties for trials is indeed punishment 
for the exercise of a constitutional right (as discussed in Part I), the Supreme 
Court has on at least one occasion come substantially close to both acknowl-
edging and defending this reality.173 In U.S. v. Jackson, the Court considered 
the constitutionality of the part of the Federal Kidnapping Act that provided for 
the sentence of death only when the defendant was found guilty by a jury.174 In 
other words, the accused was not subject to capital punishment under this stat-
ute if he plead guilty or was convicted after electing a trial before a judge on-
ly.175 
After rejecting the government’s various arguments that disputed the above 
meaning of the Act, the Court focused on why such a sentencing scheme was 
unconstitutional.176 In so holding, the Court concluded that the “inevitable ef-
fect of any such provision, is of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth 
Amendment right to demand a jury trial.”177 The Court did not, however, rest 
its decision on the existence of this effect alone and regarded as insignificant 
                                                        
167  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
168  Binderup v. Attorney Gen. United States, 836 F.3d 336, 344 (3d Cir. 2016). 
169  Id. at 346. 
170  Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977). 
171  Id. at 685–86. 
172  Id. at 686; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
173  See infra notes 175–181 and accompanying text. 
174  United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 570–71 (1968). 
175  Id. at 571. 
176  See id. at 572. 
177  Id. at 581 (citations omitted); see also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978) 
(wherein the Court made clear, specifically in connection with plea bargaining, “that not 
every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or encourage-
ment to waive such a right, is invalid”). 
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both whether this effect was intentional or collateral and whether the statute co-
erced or merely encouraged the defendant to forego his right to a jury trial. In-
stead, the Court emphasized that the government’s right to “chill” the exercise 
of such constitutional rights depended on whether that chilling was “need-
less[].”178 Later in the opinion, after recognizing the government’s claim that 
the goal of the statute was to mitigate the application of the death penalty in 
kidnapping cases, the Court alluded to other ways such a goal could be 
achieved without punishing a defendant for exercising his right to a jury trial.179 
The Court noted that, “[w]hatever the power of Congress to impose a death 
penalty for violation of the Federal Kidnaping Act, Congress cannot impose 
such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitu-
tional right.”180 The obvious implication to be drawn from the Court’s reference 
on two occasions to the inability of the government to chill or penalize the ex-
ercise of a constitutional right needlessly is that such penalizing can occur if the 
government has a need to do so. Such an approach is consistent with the 
Court’s holdings in the cases discussed above dealing with the right to free 
speech, to bear arms, privacy, and the free exercise of religion.181  
The task then is to discern whether the penalty meted out by the almost in-
evitably harsher sentence the defendant will receive because he chose to exer-
cise his constitutional right to a trial is needless. The first logical step in this as-
sessment is to recognize the usual cause-effect relationship in the decision to 
choose or forego the right to trial. This requires acknowledging that the vast 
majority of defendants who plead guilty do so because they have been prom-
ised or have reason to believe they will receive a charge and or sentencing re-
duction if they forego their right to a trial.182 In other words, they believe, and 
almost always with good reason, that they will receive a harsher sentence if 
their conviction comes from a trial and not a guilty plea.183 Aside from excep-
tional circumstances, it would be the foolish defendant who pleads guilty and 
the incompetent defense attorney who recommends he do so without this be-
lief.184 Why give up the chance for an acquittal, even if slight, if the defendant 
derives no meaningful benefit for doing so? Once this cause-effect relationship 
is accepted, the discussion must turn to whether there is a justification, a need, 
for imposing this penalty on the decision of whether to choose a trial. 
                                                        
178  Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582. 
179  Id. at 582–83. 
180  Id. at 583 (emphasis added). 
181  See discussion supra Part II. 
182  Wan, supra note 111, at 36–37. 
183  Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y. REV. 
61, 63, 67 (2015). 
184  John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargain-
ing, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 447 (2001); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s 
Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1205 (1975). 
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While many have leveled reasonable criticisms of the plea bargaining sys-
tems in place almost everywhere in the United States,185 a strong argument can 
be made that plea bargaining, in some form, is necessary to the functioning of 
criminal justice in our courts.186 The most obvious and most often mentioned 
need for plea bargaining relates to the limited resources available to handle the 
thousands of criminal cases that pass through American courts on a daily ba-
sis.187 The vast majority of criminal cases are disposed of without trials and 
most of these dispositions derive from plea bargaining.188 Outlawing plea bar-
gaining and the differential sentencing inextricably linked to it would result in 
many more trials.189 Using the generally accepted figure that 90 to 95 percent of 
criminal cases are disposed of through plea bargaining, the system would have 
to accommodate up to nineteen times the trials it already conducts now.190 Giv-
en the added time it takes to do trials, the additional manpower necessary, 
space limitations, other trial expenses such as the use of expert witnesses, and 
the inevitable appeals that follow trials, the allocation of resources needed to 
try all criminal cases that are now plead out would be monumental.191 Simply 
put, we could not afford to try these cases.192  
While the resource issue dominates any discussion of the benefits of plea 
bargaining, other benefits of the plea bargaining system should not be ignored. 
Disposing of cases through pleas is more likely to bring about the desired goal 
of prompt justice than is the often delayed trial process, complete with appeals, 
possible reversals, and retrials.193 Additionally, the reduction in court dockets 
that results from this quick resolution of cases via guilty pleas allows those cas-
es that should go to trial to be tried more expeditiously.194 While, as discussed 
                                                        
185  See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979 
(1992); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1387–
1411 (1970); Guidorizzi, supra note 109, at 767–72; Wan, supra note 111, at 40–41. 
186  Palmer, supra note 108, at 512; see also Chief Justice Warren Burger, The State of the 
Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970); Schreurs, supra note 140, at 658. 
187  Palmer, supra note 108, at 512–13; Schreurs, supra note 140, at 645–46. 
188  See Palmer, supra note 108, at 512–13. 
189  See id. 
190  See sources cited supra note 24. 
191  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“If every criminal charge were sub-
jected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by 
many times the number of judges and court facilities.”); see also John H. Blume & Rebecca 
K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 157, 164 (2014), in which the authors assert, “[i]t is almost universally ac-
cepted by the participants in the system that there is not enough personnel, court time, or 
funds to try every case, or for that matter even any significant percentage of cases.” 
192  In 1970, then Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that “[a] reduction from 90 per cent to 
80 per cent in guilty pleas requires the assignment of twice the judicial manpower and facili-
ties” and “[a] reduction to 70 per cent trebles this demand.” Warren, supra note 186, at 931. 
193  See Guidorizzi, supra note 109, at 767. 
194  See Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints, 29 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 8, 10 (2009) (arguing that plea bargaining allows more resources to 
be devoted to cases that go to trial). 
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above, the motivation for the vast majority of defendants who plead guilty is to 
obtain a milder sentence, such pleas can at least offer a quicker path to rehabili-
tation programs and approaches for defendants wishing to take advantage of 
such programs.195 
Many victims understandably wish to avoid having to testify at a criminal 
trial.196 To go through what are often painful and, in certain cases, very private 
details of a crime before a courtroom filled with strangers can be a traumatic 
experience.197 Plea bargaining allows witnesses, especially victims, to avoid 
what for most is an unwanted time commitment and, for many, an indignity.198 
Often the government’s decision to offer one defendant a lenient plea assures 
that this defendant will testify against, or at least provide information about, 
others involved in criminal activity.199 Usually this information serves the valu-
able goal of implicating those higher up in the criminal chain or those who 
were the primary participants in a given crime.200 Finally, a plea of guilty some-
times allows for a more appropriate disposition of a criminal case than would a 
verdict of guilty or not guilty on a higher charge.201 Take for example, a de-
fendant facing murder charges stemming from a fight who is claiming that he 
acted in self-defense. The jury’s verdict of guilty of murder because they did 
not accept his defense or a verdict of not guilty of all charges, if they did, may 
not be as just of an outcome as the manslaughter charge he was permitted to 
plead guilty to. 
In determining whether the burden placed on the exercise of the right to 
trial by the use of differential sentencing is needed, courts should also pay at-
tention to the negatives that flow from our current system. The goals of the ad-
versary system, complete with its protections—the right to confront and cross 
examine witnesses, the presumption of innocence, the requirement of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt, and the right to a jury trial—are largely negated in 
practice by the overwhelming use of plea bargaining.202 As discussed above, 
the differential sentencing connected inextricably to plea bargaining punishes 
the exercise of the right to trial.203 Some commentators assert that with the 
threat of increased prison sentences for defendants who elect a trial, no plea of 
                                                        
195  See discussion supra Section I.B. 
196  Guidorizzi, supra note 109, at 767. 
197  Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 133 (1997). 
198  See id. 
199  Eli Paul Mazur, Note, Rational Expectations of Leniency: Implicit Plea Agreements and 
the Prosecutor’s Role as a Minister of Justice, 51 DUKE L.J. 1333, 1333 (2002). 
200  See id. at 1334. 
201  Ursula Odiaga, Note, The Ethics of Judicial Discretion in Plea Bargaining, 2 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 695, 697 (1989) (arguing that plea bargaining allows for personalized sen-
tences which reflect the circumstances of each offender’s individual case). 
202  See Richard L. Lippke, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Constitution, 51 DUQ. L. 
REV. 709, 710 (2013). 
203  See discussion supra Part I. 
18 NEV. L.J. 769, GROSSMAN  - FINAL 5/15/18  12:24 PM 
798 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:769  
guilty is truly voluntary and all involve an unacceptable level of coercion.204 In 
a recent article, for example, Professor Donald Dripps compared the pressure 
on a criminal defendant to plead guilty when facing a long sentence of impris-
onment with that of someone threatened with the whole spectrum of “enhanced 
interrogation” techniques for seventy-two hours in order to obtain infor-
mation.205 These techniques would include “[s]leep deprivation,” “[s]imulated 
drowning,” and “[n]onmedical rectal dehydration.”206 Dripps’s conclusion was 
that “[t]he threat of forty-years imprisonment has more power to induce coop-
eration than seventy-two hours of torment.”207 
Disposing of so many cases so quickly invites a reduction in the time spent 
by attorneys in researching and preparing a case and, therefore, often results in 
a similar reduction in the quality of legal representation afforded to criminal 
defendants.208 In many cases where a plea of guilty is negotiated, a search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, a statement taken in violation of the Fifth 
or Sixth Amendments, or an identification procedure done in violation of due 
process is never litigated or even uncovered.209 The result of this is a reduction 
in the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule for such violations.210 Finally, 
although there are benefits to avoiding the testimony of victims in many trials, 
there are genuine concerns about avoiding the transparency of public trials in so 
many cases.211 
Of course, considering and weighing the benefits derived from the system 
of plea bargaining against its disadvantages involves difficult, sometimes pain-
ful acknowledgments and decisions. These discussions can largely be avoided 
with bromides such as the one claiming that everyone wins from a plea/trial 
system that offers benefits to many and punishments to none. It is hardly sur-
prising, therefore, that judges are reluctant to admit that they are punishing a 
defendant for his exercise of a constitutional right. To acknowledge this reality, 
however, contributes not just to the intellectual honesty of decisions concerning 
plea bargaining, but also opens the door to more tangible benefits.  
                                                        
204  See, e.g., Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea 
Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 71–72 (2005). 
205  Dripps, supra note 44, at 1343. 
206  Id. 
207  Id. at 1345. 
208  Molly J. Walker Wilson, Defense Attorney Bias and the Rush to the Plea, 65 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 271, 293–95 (2016); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Ne-
gotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 78–81 (1995). 
209  See Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 564, 573 (1977); see also Palmer, supra note 108, at 524. 
210  See Palmer, supra note 108, at 524. 
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(1998). 
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III. AN EXPANDED FORM OF JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE BARGAINING 
PROCESS 
The issue of whether and to what degree judges should become involved in 
the plea bargaining process has garnered much debate.212 Proponents of judicial 
involvement argue among other things that as judges are the ultimate sen-
tencers, they should let both the prosecution and the defense know their views 
regarding the appropriate disposition of a case before a plea bargain is accept-
ed.213 Additionally, judicial involvement is seen as a means of curtailing the 
abuse by prosecutors of the substantial discretion that they have in both the 
charging and the plea negotiation processes.214 Opponents fear that judicial par-
ticipation in the bargaining process can take the form of judicial pressure upon 
a defendant to accept a bargain, and therefore make the process unduly coer-
cive.215 They note that should the defendant reject a plea that seems to have the 
judge’s imprimatur, it will be more difficult or at the very least appear more 
difficult for the defendant to then get a fair trial.216 Additionally, a subsequent 
claim that the plea was involuntary or improper in some way is likely to appear 
initially before the very same judge who helped negotiate and ultimately ac-
cepted the plea.217 Again, this makes for at least the perception that such a chal-
lenge will not be adjudicated completely without bias.218 Whether a jurisdiction 
permits judicial participation in plea bargaining or not, the judge in almost all 
instances must accept a plea of guilty before it can be entered.219 
Given this debate, it is hardly surprising that American jurisdictions are di-
vided over the role of judges in the plea bargaining process.220 These divisions 
                                                        
212  King & Wright, supra note 134, at 325–26. 
213  See Thomas D. Lambros, Plea Bargaining and the Sentencing Process, 53 F.R.D. 509, 
515–16 (1972). 
214  Rishi Raj Batra, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Dispute Resolution Per-
spective, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 565, 585–86 (2015). 
215  Id. at 581. As one court stated, 
The unequal positions of the judge and the accused, one with the power to commit to prison and 
the other deeply concerned to avoid prison, at once raise a question of fundamental fairness. 
When a judge becomes a participant in plea bargaining he brings to bear the full force and maj-
esty of his office. His awesome power to impose a substantially longer or even maximum sen-
tence in excess of that proposed is present whether referred to or not. A defendant needs no re-
minder that if he rejects the proposal, stands upon his right to trial and is convicted, he faces a 
significantly longer sentence. One facing a prison term, whether of longer or shorter duration, is 
easily influenced to accept what appears the more preferable choice. 
United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 201–02 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing United States ex rel. 
Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). 
216  Turner, supra note 120, at 199. 
217  See Batra, supra note 214, at 581. 
218  Id. at 583. 
219  See, e g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; Pa. R. Crim. P. § 590 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035 
(2017); TENN. R. CRIM. P. § 11 (2015). 
220  See Rachel Broder, Comment, Fair and Effective Administration of Justice: Amending 
Rule 11(c)(1) to Allow for Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 357, 
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are reflected in the questions of whether judges should be involved at all in the 
process and if so, to what degree.221 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and the rules of many states prohibit judicial involvement in the negotiations of 
the plea, but still require the judge’s acceptance of the plea before it takes effect 
in almost all circumstances.222 Other states permit, with certain limitations and 
various protections against judicial coercion, judges to participate in some 
ways.223 For example, Michigan, Florida, and Connecticut all allow judges to 
make commitments in some form as to what their sentence or at least the max-
imum sentence will be if the plea is accepted by the parties.224 
One thing is clear however. If a judge states directly or even hints too 
overtly that the sentence she metes out to the accused is likely to be greater 
should the defendant forego a plea offer and be convicted at trial, that will lead 
to an almost certain reversal of the ultimate sentence should it be challenged.225 
The almost universal reason why appellate courts invalidate such a sentence is 
because the judge is said to have punished the defendant for exercising his con-
stitutional right to trial.226 As discussed in Part I, virtually all the differential 
sentencing that is a vital component of plea bargaining can be characterized as 
such punishment.227 For that reason, an accurate statement of the post-trial sen-
tence by the judge may well sound threatening and seem coercive to a defend-
ant.228 But the coercion in such a case may stem not from any impropriety on 
part of the judge, but from the sentencing structure that encourages plea bar-
                                                                                                                                 
370–71 (2016); see, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(a) (2018); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.171(d) (1993); 
Haw. R. Penal P. 11(f)(1) (2014). 
221  Broder, supra note 220, at 371. 
222  See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.171(d); State v. Revelo, 775 A.2d 260, 
267–68 (Conn. 2001); People v. Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d 208, 211–12 (Mich. 1993). Notwith-
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Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: 
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not necessary to insure the voluntariness of guilty pleas. 
Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1970). 
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224  Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d at 212; State v. Warner, 762 So.2d 507, 514 (Fla. 2000); Revelo, 775 
A.2d at 268. 
225  See, e.g., United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 2014); Davis v. State, 860 
So.2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 01-P-1139, 2002 
WL 1012615, at *1–*2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). 
226  See cases and materials cited supra notes 30–94. 
227  See cases and materials cited supra notes 20–151. 
228  See Turner, supra note 120, at 243. 
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gaining through substantial sentence discounts.229 Allowing judges to provide 
assessments of the post-trial sentence, as they do in Germany,230 is not likely to 
have any independent coercive effect on the defendant. On the contrary, in 
some instances it may diminish the coercive influence of our sentencing 
schemes by narrowing the range between the expected post-trial and post-plea 
sentences. The difference in this instance is that the judge acknowledged it and 
did so early on when the defendant was making his decision whether to accept 
a plea (although, even when the judge so comments at the time of sentencing 
after a trial, that too will usually lead to an invalidation of the sentence). What 
traditionally warrants reversal then is not the deed of sentencing more harshly 
after trial, but the word of acknowledging this reality. Whether a jurisdiction 
permits or prohibits judicial participation in plea bargaining, it is generally 
deemed to be unduly coercive to tell the defendant what his likely post-
conviction sentence will be or even hint that it will be more severe than that 
which he will receive based on his plea.231  
This almost universally accepted limitation on providing the defendant 
with any information regarding what his sentence might be if he rejects a plea 
bargain and is convicted at trial, however, is paternalistic in nature and in most 
cases harms the party it is designed to protect.232 This can be seen quite clearly 
by considering a similar type of information limitation regarding other crucial 
decisions in a person’s life. Imagine, for example, being told that you had a 
possible life-threatening tumor. After exploring the various medical issues with 
you, the doctor suggests that you seriously consider a complicated surgery to 
have the growth removed. Inevitably, you will inquire as to your chances for 
survival if you have the surgery. Let’s say the doctor tells you your chances of 
survival are 50 percent with the operation. Can you make an intelligent deci-
sion based on that information alone? I hope so, because when you ask the ob-
vious next question which is, “what are my chances if I do not have the sur-
gery”, the doctor politely demurs. He chooses not to tell you that your chances 
of survival without the surgery are only about 25 percent or even that they are 
                                                        
229  See McConkie, supra note 183, at 76–78. For example, judges are permitted to inform 
defendants of the higher possible sentence they can receive for criminal charges they face if 
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prosecutor’s plea offer.” King & Wright, supra note 134, at 385–86. 
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the sentencing decision to be affected by whether the defendant pleads guilty or goes to tri-
al). But see King & Wright, supra note 134, at 385 (relating that certain judges will tell the 
likely post-trial sentence). 
232  McConkie, supra note 183, at 75–76. 
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less than if you have the surgery because he does not wish to coerce you into 
having the surgery. Time to find another doctor. 
As with plea bargaining, it is true that being told of the greater likelihood 
of negative consequences in forgoing surgery might persuade or even pressure 
you into making a certain decision. Still, would you want to make such a criti-
cal decision in your life without having access to that information? The intelli-
gent patient might wish to get a second opinion before choosing the surgery, 
just as the accused in a criminal case will seek the opinion of his counsel and 
perhaps his family before making his critical decision about whether to accept a 
plea-based sentence that a judge will mete out in lieu of going to trial. As the 
attorney in our criminal justice system is entrusted with protecting the rights of 
the accused in many situations, she can be a barrier to most kinds of coercion in 
the plea bargaining process as well.233 
This is not to suggest that the judge’s role in plea bargaining, particularly 
when discussing with the defendant and or his counsel the likely range of sen-
tence if he is convicted at trial, cannot become unduly coercive.234 As with the 
hypothetical surgeon discussed above, such coercion can come from the man-
ner in which the judge communicates the expected likely post-trial sentence 
range.235 Just as the surgeon can browbeat a patient into surgery by overdrama-
tizing the benefits of the operation or using terrifying language to warn of the 
dangers of rejecting the surgery, judges can use threatening language and other 
coercive means to pressure a defendant into accepting a plea. In such situations, 
appellate courts would be the bodies to protect against such judicial abuse. It 
would be nothing new for appellate courts to base their decisions regarding ju-
dicial impropriety on the manner that a judge communicated something to a de-
fendant.236 
                                                        
233  Id. at 80–82; see also King & Wright, supra note 134, at 386–87 wherein defense attor-
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There is another means by which judges might abuse their role in a system 
that permits them to provide defendants with information about what a post-
trial sentence might look like. Should the defendant reject the sentence offered 
by the judge as part of a guilty plea and be convicted at trial, the disparity be-
tween the length of the judge’s plea offer and post-trial sentence could be ex-
cessive.237 In responding to this type of apparent vindictiveness, courts should 
use a robust proportionality analysis, somewhat similar to, but even stricter 
than, the overall approach they take when determining if any sentence is cruel 
and unusual under the Eighth Amendment due to its length.238 Here, the deter-
mination would be based not only on the actual length of the sentence, but also 
whether it was grossly disparate to the sentence the judge agreed to if the de-
fendant pled guilty.239 
Understandably, even with these protections, there is a tension between the 
knowing and intelligent nature of a guilty plea and its voluntariness.240 Resolv-
ing this tension requires acknowledging just how much the American system of 
criminal justice has become beholden to plea bargaining.241 We permit pleas to 
offenses that are logical impossibilities such as attempted resisting arrest or at-
                                                        
237  State v. Pennington, 693 A.2d 1222, 1225 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“That a sen-
tence imposed after a trial is more severe than a previously-rejected plea offer is not alone a 
basis for finding the actual sentence excessive. However, an extreme disparity between the 
State’s offer and the sentence imposed after trial can be considered by this court when re-
viewing the reasonableness of the sentence.”); see, e.g., cases cited supra note 20. One area 
in which courts consider the disparity between a sentence offered as part of a plea and the 
ultimate sentence meted out after a trial is in reviewing claims of inadequate representation 
stemming from counsel’s failure to communicate or assess competently a plea offer. Preju-
dice is one of the elements required by the Supreme Court to establish such a Sixth Amend-
ment claim. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57–58 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The disparity noted above is used to demonstrate prejudice in such 
Sixth Amendment claims. See, e.g., Pham v. United States, 317 F.3d 178, 178, 180, 183 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (Defendant rejected offer of 78–97 months ultimately being sentenced to 210 
months. Court holds lower court should have considered this disparity); Carrion v. Smith, 
644 F. Supp. 2d 452, 471–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Court finds difference between plea offer of 
10 years to life and post-trial sentence of 125 years to life to be “extremely large” and meets 
prejudice requirement); Shiwlochan v. Portuondo, 345 F. Supp. 2d 242, 263–64 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004) (Court regards “vast difference” between plea offer of 15 years to life and post-trial 
sentence of 41 2/3 years to life to be prejudicial). 
238  Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20–25 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 
959 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284–90 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 
288–95 (1980). 
239  Inevitably, the post-trial sentence would be harsher than the one rejected by the defend-
ant during plea negotiations, and the question would be only whether that difference was so 
great that it exceeded the normal price a defendant paid in such situations. See, e.g., People 
v. Dennis, 328 N.E.2d 135, 137–38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (Defendant was offered a plea of two 
years. Defendant rejected the plea, went to trial, and was sentenced to forty to eighty years). 
240  See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
241  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 (2012) (“[T]he reality [is] that criminal justice 
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials”). 
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tempted bribery.242 We permit defendants to plead guilty without acknowledg-
ing their guilt and even when they proclaim their innocence.243 We do so be-
cause, on balance, the courts have decided that the advantages of accepting 
such pleas outweigh the problems that would exist if such pleas were not al-
lowed.244 Why else would a criminal justice system that values so highly the 
right of confrontation, the right to a jury trial, the requirement of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and other due process protections permit convictions large-
ly in the absence of these protections, even as the defendant affirmatively de-
nies his guilt? 
In permitting guilty pleas by those protesting their innocence, the Supreme 
Court in North Carolina v. Alford observed that although the defendant was 
pleading guilty solely out of his fear of a heavier penalty after his likely convic-
tion at trial,245 so long as he was making a knowing decision, the Constitution 
did not prohibit him from doing what he perceived to be in his best interest.246 
In the Court’s words, “[t]he prohibitions against involuntary or unintelligent 
pleas should not be relaxed, but neither should an exercise in arid logic render 
those constitutional guarantees counterproductive and put in jeopardy the very 
human values they were meant to preserve.”247 In other words, the courts need 
not protect a defendant from doing what he regards to be in his best interest as 
long as there is some basis for believing that is precisely what he is doing.248 
The Court’s holding in Alford, a clear triumph for the notion of a robust bar-
gaining system in criminal cases, demonstrates that absent exceptional circum-
stances, when the prosecutor, the defendant as advised by competent counsel, 
and the judge agree on a bargaining process and result, the constitution will 
                                                        
242  Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep’t, 389 F.3d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 2004) (Defendant 
plead guilty to trespass and attempted resisting arrest); People v. Lotito, 495 N.Y.S.2d 483, 
483 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (Defendant plead guilty to second degree attempted bribery); 
People v. Foster, 225 N.E.2d 200, 201 (N.Y. 1967) (Defendant plead guilty to attempted 
manslaughter). 
243  Regarding nolo contendere pleas, see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2). For the sanctioning 
of guilty pleas when the defendant denies his guilt, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 
25, 25 (1970). 
244  Alford, 400 U.S. at 25. Although not explicitly expressed by the Court in Alford, if De-
fendants were required to acknowledge guilt in order to plead guilty, Defendants would be 
forced to lie as in the old days when they said no promises were made to induce their pleas. 
See Robert L. Segar, Plea Bargaining Techniques § 2, 25 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 69 (1978). 
245  Alford, 400 U.S. at 29 n.2. At trial, the Defendant told the court: 
I pleaded guilty on second degree murder because they said there is too much evidence, but I 
ain’t shot no man, but I take the fault for the other man. We never had an argument in our life 
and I just pleaded guilty because they said if I didn’t they would gas me for it, and that is all.  
In response to questions from his attorney, Alford affirmed that he had consulted several 
times with his attorney and with members of his family and had been informed of his rights 
if he chose to plead not guilty. 
246  Id. at 37. 
247  Id. at 39. 
248  For example, in Alford, the Court required that there be a strong basis in fact establishing 
the defendant’s guilt before an Alford plea is accepted. Id. at 37–38. 
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rarely stand in the way of the conclusion at which they arrive.249 Implicitly, the 
decision rejects the paternalistic notion that the courts should “protect” defend-
ants by not letting them do what they perceive to be in their best interest and 
when advised by competent counsel.250 
This approach to the plea bargaining process should be applied to the issue 
of whether a judge can offer her thoughts at some point during plea negotia-
tions regarding the range of the accused’s sentence should he be convicted at 
trial. Such an approach would offer the accused the ability to make a genuinely 
informed and intelligent choice about whether to accept a plea offer.251 At the 
very least, the judge should be permitted to confirm what any competent attor-
ney would have told his client: that the sentence will almost assuredly be great-
er than the one you are being offered in exchange for your guilty plea.252 Such 
an obvious observation should not be prohibited as it is now, by the equally ob-
vious conclusion, that this creates a trial penalty. To do so would prohibit not 
the act, but only the acknowledgment of the act.253 Beyond that however, a 
judge, normally in possession of most of the details that will affect the defend-
ant’s post-trial sentence, such as the nature of the crime, the defendant’s back-
ground, and the general manner in which such cases are sentenced both in her 
jurisdiction and by her, should be able to offer a range of likely post-trial sen-
tences.254 The judge should take care to convey this information in a neutral 
manner that applies no additional pressure on the defendant to accept the 
plea.255 The judge should not forget that her role here is to inform, not advocate 
for acceptance of the plea.  
As in many other aspects of representing a client, the role of defense coun-
sel here is crucial.256 His duties, as always, include providing a thoughtful as-
sessment of the plea offer, the likelihood of conviction at trial, the probable 
                                                        
249  See id. at 39. 
250  See George C. Thomas III, Helping Innocent Defendants in High Stakes Cases, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 58, 59 (2008). Defending Alford pleas, one commentator wrote 
that, “Ultimately, a system that respects the autonomy of the guilty to forfeit trial rights 
should respect the autonomy of the innocent to do the same.” Josh Bowers, Punishing the 
Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1164 (2008). 
251  McConkie, supra note 183, at 84. 
252  Id. Presumably such confirmation by the person meting out the sentence would provide a 
degree of certainty that most defendants would welcome. 
253  See, e.g., Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293, 294 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. 
Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 565–67 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
254  See supra Section I.C. Information regarding the potential post-trial sentence is even 
more important for attorneys in jurisdictions that do not utilize sentencing guidelines. 
Turner, supra note 120, at 258. 
255  For example, a judge, upon request of the defendant or his counsel, might say, “If you are 
convicted after trial on Robbery in the 2nd Degree, and I learn nothing new of significance 
concerning the crime or your participation in it, I am likely to sentence you to something in 
the range of four to six years in prison. Should you accept the plea offered by the govern-
ment, I have agreed to a sentence of thirty months incarceration.” 
256  Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2650 (2013) (ar-
guing that defense counsel plays a critical role in the plea bargaining process). 
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sentence if convicted, and to act as a barrier to any coercion by the prosecutor 
or the judge.257 The difference now would be that he could perform his job with 
more information. 
There is a legitimate concern that judicial participation in the bargaining 
process adds pressure on the defendant to plead guilty.258 Especially in a nego-
tiation process, during which the judge offers information on a possible sen-
tence if the defendant rejects the plea and is convicted at trial, defendants might 
fear judicial vindictiveness if they opt for a trial.259 There are several ways to 
mitigate this potential for coerciveness while still deriving the benefits that 
come from negotiating a truly informed plea. 
First, the judge should avoid providing the defendant with information 
about what sentence she will mete out if a rejected plea leads to a conviction at 
trial unless the defendant through his attorney asks for such information.260 
When the judge volunteers without first being asked by the defendant the likely 
sentence he will receive if he rejects the plea offer and is convicted at trial, this 
creates too great a risk that the judge will be viewed as the primary force be-
hind the plea offer.261 Such affirmative judicial conduct adds to the coercive na-
ture of plea bargaining and does so entirely unnecessarily.262 To deny the de-
fendant such information when he affirmatively requests it, however, results in 
compelling the defendant to make a crucial life decision without the material he 
understandably believes he needs to make a fully knowing decision about 
whether to accept a plea offer.263 Doing so supposedly for the defendant’s own 
benefit, that is, to avoid coercing him into taking the plea, smacks of paternal-
ism and deprives the defense attorney of the means to effectively represent his 
client.264  
                                                        
257  Joel Mallord, Comment, Putting Plea Bargaining on the Record, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 683, 
699–705 (2014). 
258  Broder, supra note 220, at 363. 
259  See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 457, 460 (4th Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Barrett, 982 F.2d 193, 194, 196 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 
554, 558 (9th Cir. 1992); Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293, 294 (10th Cir. 1957). 
260  Turner, supra note 120, at 257–58. 
261  See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 197 F.3d 156, 158–59 (5th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 1973); Euziere, 249 F.2d at 295; Wil-
son v. State, 845 So. 2d 142, 151 (Fla. 2003); United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 567 
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
262  Rodriguez, 197 F.3d at 158–59; Stockwell, 472 F.2d at 1187–88; Euziere, 249 F.2d at 
295; Wilson, 845 So. 2d at 151; Tateo, 214 F. Supp. at 567. 
263  McConkie, supra note 183, at 76–78. 
264  If you doubt that, put yourself in the role of a defense attorney having been offered a plea 
deal for your client by the prosecutor. If the proposed sentence was acceptable to your client, 
it is obvious you would want the judge’s commitment that she would go along with the 
agreed sentence. But what if you knew, if asked, this judge would also share with you her 
thoughts on what range of sentence your client would receive if he were convicted at trial? 
What competent attorney would not want that information before recommending to his client 
whether to accept the plea offer? Speaking generally about the defense attorney’s role in plea 
bargaining, one court asserted, “[i]n many, or even most, cases, the only defense available is 
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Second, the judge should avoid giving the precise sentence she will mete 
out as it is possible, albeit not the usual course, that something genuinely mate-
rial and unknown to the judge during the negotiations will be learned during the 
trial or an event might occur between the plea offer and the trial that appropri-
ately could affect the sentence.265 Therefore, the judge should provide only a 
range for the likely sentence the defendant will receive if convicted at trial, 
while putting on the record any caveats that could affect the ultimate sen-
tence.266 Some information about a potential post-trial sentence is certainly bet-
ter than none to a defendant trying to make the best decision for himself about 
whether to accept a plea. 
Third, in jurisdictions where there are enough judges, the judge who han-
dles the negotiations and offers the information about a post-trial conviction 
sentence range perhaps should not be the one who conducts the trial and then 
sentences the defendant.267 As judges have differing views about the appropri-
ate sentence to mete out in particular cases, this clearly reduces the information 
the defendant will have about his actual post-trial sentence.268 Accordingly, I 
would recommend that such a change of judges not take place unless the de-
fendant so requested the change and no other impediments to such a change ex-
isted.  
As with the plea offer, the judge’s response to the defendant’s request for a 
post-trial sentence range should be placed on the record.269 This would act as a 
deterrent to judges ultimately sentencing the defendant out of vindictiveness for 
rejecting the plea offer.270 Under this regimen, post-trial sentences substantially 
harsher than those accepted by the judge as part of a plea negotiation process 
would raise red flags as being suggestive of judicial vindictiveness.271 In the 
current plea bargaining process, such vindictiveness happens frequently but is 
harder to identify.272 Providing the defendant with information about a likely 
                                                                                                                                 
the determination and nerve of the defense attorney. To deprive the attorney of the oppor-
tunity to talk to the judge about a guilty plea before a defendant has made up his mind to 
plead guilty, would deprive him of one of the most valuable tools of his defense.” 
Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352,1356 (4th Cir. 1970). 
265  See generally cases and notes discussed supra Section I.C; see also Wilson v. State, 845 
So. 2d 142, 157 (Fla. 2003) (“The trial judge must make clear that the sentence is based on 
what the judge presently has before him or her, and must caution that there is no guarantee 
that this same sentence will be imposed if the defendant elects to go to trial.”); McConkie, 
supra note 183, at 87–88. 
266  Vondervor v. State, 847 So. 2d 610, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); McConkie, supra 
note 183, at 88. 
267  Daniel Klein, Judicial Participation in Guilty Pleas—A Search for Standards, 33 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 151, 159 (1971). 
268  See id. 
269  Turner, supra note 120, at 262. 
270  Broder, supra note 220, at 380 (arguing that putting plea negotiations on the record de-
ters judicial coercion). 
271  Turner, supra note 120, at 262. 
272  See e.g., Anderson v. State, 335 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ind. 1975): 
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post-trial sentence and placing this on the record during plea negotiations, 
therefore, could reduce the likelihood of such judicial vindictiveness.273 It is 
this potential for judicial vindictiveness that is often offered as the argument in 
opposition to judge’s providing post-trial sentencing information to defend-
ants.274 Yet, ironically, providing this information and placing it on the record 
should have the effect of curtailing that vindictiveness. 
In an important recent study of the role of judges in the plea bargaining 
system, Professors Nancy King and Ronald Wright interviewed prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and judges throughout the United States.275 Through these 
interviews, the authors were able to enumerate the advantages of a more robust 
                                                                                                                                 
We are confronted in this case with a record which does not permit us to look at all the circum-
stances surrounding the Appellant’s guilty plea. The trial judge, while presiding over the Appel-
lant’s trial, conducted plea bargaining negotiations. What was the extent of these negotiations? 
When did they take place? What did they consist of? The record is silent. The Appellant’s “Peti-
tion to Enter a Plea of Guilty” is self-contradictory, stating at one point that no promises were 
made and at another that the sentence on the bargained plea is to be a determinate sentence of 
eleven years. . . . While we cannot say that the trial court here induced an involuntary guilty 
plea, neither can we say that, based on the record, it did not. The irregularity of a presiding trial 
judge conducting plea bargaining makes it even more imperative that a sound record affirmative-
ly showing voluntariness be made. 
273  People v. Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Mich. 1993) (“The judge’s neutral and impartial 
role is enhanced when a judge provides a clear statement of information that is helpful to the 
parties.”). 
274  See cases cited supra note 26. The case of United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186 (9th 
Cir. 1973) offers an example of the dilemma posed by judges who offer pre-plea information 
to defendants about their likely sentence if convicted at trial. For the defendant considering 
whether to accept a plea offer, the requirement that he choose between a sentence he may 
know he will receive (if he accepts the plea deal) and one about which he has no idea (the 
sentence if he is convicted at trial) deprives him of information critical to making an in-
formed choice. In Stockwell, the judge agreed to the three-year prison sentence if the defend-
ant plead guilty. Id. at 1187. He then told Stockwell that if he rejected the plea and was con-
victed at trial, his sentence range would be from five to seven years. Id. Stockwell rejected 
the plea and was convicted of a charge, the maximum prison time for which was fifteen 
years, and other counts for which he could receive additional prison time. Id. The judge hon-
ored what he told Stockwell before the plea was rejected and sentenced him to seven years. 
Id. The Court of Appeals invalidated the sentence because “courts must not use the sentenc-
ing power as a carrot and stick to clear congested calendars, and they must not create an ap-
pearance of such a practice.” Id. In this case, the record failed to show that “the court sen-
tenced the defendant solely upon the facts of his case and his personal history, and not as 
punishment for his refusal to plead guilty” Id. at 1188. Of course, Stockwell received more 
prison time for choosing to go to trial and rejecting the plea offer as does virtually every de-
fendant who opts for trial over a plea offer. In fact, the additional time he received is no-
where near that which has been regarded by some courts as excessive. Id. at 1187. What is 
different in Stockwell’s case is that he had the ability to make an informed choice at the time 
he decided to reject the plea offer. It was the fact that the judge provided him with this in-
formation that the Court of Appeals regarded as punishment. The obvious message to the 
trial judge is that you can sentence the defendant to more prison time if he rejects a plea and 
is convicted at trial. Just don’t signal you are going to do so by mentioning it before he de-
cides on the plea offer. In the mind of this court and virtually all courts who decide the same 
way about providing defendants with such information, the defendant’s ignorance is bliss. 
275  King & Wright, supra note 134, at 325. 
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role for judges in plea negotiations for all the parties involved. Prosecutors re-
ported that judicial participation helped them manage their relationships with 
the police, victims, and the public.276 By shifting some of the responsibility for 
the plea deal to judges, there is less chance that the prosecutor will receive neg-
ative publicity, and victims are assuaged by the knowledge that no efforts of the 
prosecutor could have led to a greater sentence for their victimizer.277 Defense 
attorneys reported that judicial involvement leads to more appropriately lenient 
sentences,278 in part because the judge gives the prosecutor a face-saving way to 
admit the weaknesses in her case.279 Judges saw their contribution as a means to 
correct errors by perhaps inexperienced attorneys on either side and to offer op-
tions that may not have been considered by the attorneys.280 There was substan-
tial agreement that the more a judge could offer to the settlement of a criminal 
case, the more the system could achieve a greater degree of certainty regarding 
the resolution of the case, a benefit to all parties.281 
A more substantial role for the judge in plea negotiations, if conducted and 
monitored properly, would make the plea bargaining system more transparent 
and honest, and would benefit all parties involved in tangible ways. Prosecutors 
could better explain to the victims and the public why they disposed of a case 
as they did and judges could use their wisdom, neutrality, and experience to of-
fer the parties sensible and creative options to settle a case without the costs 
and uncertainty that result from trials. Most profoundly, we could minimize the 
counterproductive paternalism that prevents defendants from access to infor-
mation, the possession of which is usually in their best interest, as they decide 
whether to accept a plea offer. 
CONCLUSION 
 For some time now, disposing of cases through plea agreements has been 
the rule, rather than the exception, throughout American criminal justice sys-
tems.282 Over time we have moved slowly but significantly towards making the 
plea process more transparent. It is time now to complete that move and to in-
ject meaningful honesty into what the system does and why it does it in the vast 
majority of cases. Specifically, when the severity of sentences is based to a sig-
nificant extent on the defendant’s decision whether to opt for a trial, we have to 
acknowledge that this is usually as much a penalty for exercising a constitu-
tional right as it is a benefit for surrendering that right.283 
                                                        
276  Id. at 365. 
277  Id. at 369. 
278  Id. at 365. 
279  Id. at 371–72. 
280  Id. at 365. 
281  Id. at 373. 
282  See supra note 24. 
283  See supra Section I.A. 
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 This article has shown why the justifications offered to deny this reality are 
either fatally flawed or largely insignificant.284 Additionally, it has argued that 
this punishment for exercise of a constitutional right does not doom the practice 
of differential sentencing necessary for plea bargaining to exist.285 Cases have 
demonstrated that a price may be placed on the exercise of a constitutional right 
if the need for doing so is great enough.286 Arguably, the benefits to society of 
plea bargaining meet that test. 
 Finally the article has advocated for a more robust role for judges during 
plea negotiations.287 Judges are uniquely positioned to provide benefits for all 
parties in the criminal justice system if they are permitted to offer some infor-
mation about the sentence they would impose should the defendant plead guilty 
or reject the plea offered and be convicted after trial.288 Such advice provides a 
degree of certainty that benefits everyone involved and avoids the kind of sys-
tem imposed paternalism that prevents defendants from access to information 
that would help them make a crucial decision in their lives.289  
                                                        
284  See supra Sections I.A–I.D. 
285  See supra Part II. 
286  See supra Part II. 
287  See supra Part III. 
288  See supra Part III. 
289  See supra Part III. 
